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Learning in Hybrid-Project Systems:  
The Effects of Project Performance on Repeated Collaboration 
 
 
This paper advances contingency theories of performance-outcome learning in hybrid-
project systems, in which both project participants and superordinate organizations influence the 
formation of project ventures. We propose that performance-outcome learning depends on the 
perceived relevance of performance feedback and organizational control over project 
participants. We find support for our theory in a sample of 239 U.S. movie projects from 1931-
1940. Higher levels of project performance led to future collaborations with the same partners 
contingent on prior collaborations, project similarity, and organizational control. Our findings 
imply distinct patterns of network evolution and that any adaptation by hybrid-project systems 
may unfold through slow-moving and local adjustments. 
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Short-term flexible networks and project-based ventures have spurred interest as 
industries migrate toward more fluid, network-based production (Piore & Sabel, 1984; Schilling 
& Steensma, 2001; Zenger & Hesterly, 1997). We define a project venture as a temporary entity 
that combines several participants to accomplish a single predetermined short-term task. When 
the short-term task has been completed, the project team disbands (Sydow, Lindkvist, & 
DeFillippi, 2004). Among the advantages cited for such project-based production are 
opportunities to address changes in task demands and contributor capabilities (Jones, Hesterly, & 
Borgatti, 1997; Lampel, Lant, & Shamsie, 2000; Storper, 1989). In spite of the widespread 
assumption about their adaptive capabilities, however, project ventures also face considerable 
learning and adaptation obstacles (Bechky, 2006; Grabher, 2004; Jones, Hesterly, Fladmoe-
Linquist, & Borgatti, 1998; Taylor & Greve, 2006).  
In this study, we propose a conditional model for when and how performance outcomes 
of prior projects will influence whether a project's participants will collaborate again in a future 
project. We thus investigate performance-outcome learning. We define this as occurring when a 
higher level of performance outcome for a given activity increases the chances that this activity 
will occur again (Cyert & March, 1963, 1992). Conceptually, performance-outcome learning 
includes both trial-and-error learning from one’s own experience (Van de Ven & Polley, 1992) 
and vicarious learning from observed performance outcomes of actions by others (Haunschild & 
Miner, 1997). It represents a special case of organizational learning, which has been defined as a 
systematic change in behavior or knowledge resulting from experience (Argote, 1999). 
Standard models of performance-outcome learning assume that the same entity observes 
outcomes, interprets them, and repeats activities that generated good outcomes and avoids 
activities with negative outcomes (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003; March & Olsen, 1976). In 
project systems, by definition, the project participants disband after task completion and the 
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project team ceases to exist as a formal entity. It cannot – as a formal entity – serve as 
organizational memory or the engine of future action. This creates challenges for performance-
outcome learning as the learning cycle has to be completed in other ways -- if it is to occur at all.  
Another important potential obstacle for the completion of a learning cycle is control 
over the formation of future project ventures. At one extreme in stand-alone project systems, 
participants choose freely whether or not to join. These systems form the template for many 
studies of project collaboration and are presumed to apply to such domains as IPO syndicates (Li 
& Rowley, 2002), collaborations among independent service contractors (Jones et al., 1998), and 
contemporary independent movie productions (Baker & Faulkner, 1991; Jones, 1996). At the 
other extreme, projects can be fully embedded in a higher-level permanent organization that 
controls what projects are initiated and who joins them. Examples include proprietary internal 
R&D projects (Hansen, 1999; Katz, 1982; Van de Ven & Polley, 1992) and internal short-term 
taskforces in traditional manufacturing and service settings (Edmondson, Bohmer, & Pisano, 
2001; Grabher, 2004). 
In this study, we explore performance-outcome learning in the important middle ground 
where neither full independence nor total organizational control dominates the project-formation 
processes. We define this as a hybrid-project system. Formation of at least some projects is more 
centrally controlled by superordinate organizations which can curb, but do not completely 
eliminate the influence of project participants on project formation.  Both organizations and 
individuals, then, can influence future project participation. Some hybrid systems tilt toward the 
stand-alone end of the continuum, such as construction collaborations, open-source software 
projects, grass-roots political movements, or faculty research teams across universities (Fleming 
& Sorenson, 2004; Jones et al., 1998). Examples for more centrally controlled settings include 
repertoire theaters that combine their regular actors with outside talent for special productions or 
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political campaign teams that embody strong party-level influence. Although they can vary in 
their position on this spectrum, hybrid-project systems represent an important conceptual frontier 
since most prior work has focused on systems either dominated by stand-alone projects or fully-
embedded projects. 
We introduce a conditional framework of performance-outcome learning in hybrid-
project systems. First, we propose that prior collaboration and project-task similarity will 
enhance the perceived relevance of the performance feedback of a focal project and therefore 
increase the tendency of the same participants to collaborate again in future project ventures. 
Second, we argue that organizational power, in the form of institutional control over project 
participants, will also moderate the impact of performance outcomes for a focal project. Such 
control facilitates recreating or barring repeated collaborations. This can determine whether a 
cycle of performance-outcome learning can be completed.  
We test related hypotheses by examining whether the performance of specific movie 
projects shaped the chances that key project participants worked together again in the U.S. movie 
industry during the 1930s. Historical descriptions reveal that both studios and individuals 
influenced the selection of project participants, and that performance outcomes were known 
industry-wide. Thus, the movie industry at that time represented a hybrid-project system and 
performance-outcome learning could occur in principle. We use quantitative data on 239 movie 
projects to test our theory-based hypotheses.  
To foreshadow our results, performance-outcome learning did not occur unconditionally 
in this hybrid system. Instead, a prior movie’s performance had an impact only when there had 
been recent prior collaboration, or when the prior project was of the same type as the future one. 
These results are consistent with our theory that perceived relevance will enhance outcome 
learning. Second, levels of organizational control over project participants also shaped when 
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outcome learning occurred -- consistent with theories that organizational control and power play 
a key role for completing performance-outcome learning cycles in some contexts. 
Our investigation contributes to three major areas. First, it introduces theory and related 
evidence that advance our understanding of project systems. It highlights the presence of hybrid-
project systems and their distinct features. It proposes and tests theory about specific causal 
factors that affect how repeated collaboration unfolds in such systems -- a key topic in the 
emerging project-venture literature (Grabher, 2004; Jones et al., 1998; Sorenson & Waguespack, 
2006; Zuckerman, 2004). 
Second, this study advances organizational learning theory by introducing a contingency 
framework for performance-outcome learning in hybrid-project systems. Our support for 
conditional effects underscores the importance of learning context, since work in some other 
settings has supported unconditional performance effects (Li & Rowley, 2002). Our results 
related to perceived relevance highlight the importance of project visibility and project similarity 
in a dynamic learning context. They also highlight how organizational power is an important 
driver facilitating the completion of performance-feedback cycles in hybrid-project systems. This 
contrasts with prior studies that often focus primarily on cognitive processes and information as 
drivers. It also contrasts with the common emphasis on learning as a source of power (Ahuja, 
2000; Grant, 1996) rather than power as an influence on learning itself (Rura-Polley & Miner, 
2002).  
Finally, our work has value for practice. It promotes attention to adaptive implications of 
hybrid-project systems and offers insights for contemporary industries that are migrating toward 
more fluid and project-based production (Piore & Sabel, 1984; Sydow et al., 2004; Zenger & 
Hesterly, 1997). Our study invites the thoughtful attention of managers and policy makers to the 
strengths and limitations of hybrid-project systems as engines of adaptation, which we discuss 
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briefly at the close of the paper. 
To illustrate the construct of a hybrid-project system and how our research setting 
embodies this type of system, we first describe the specific industry context of our study. We 
then present the formal hypotheses about performance-outcome learning in this context. 
RESEARCH SETTING 
The U.S. 1931-1940 Movie Industry as a Hybrid-Project System 
The U.S. movie industry in the 1930s provides a clear instance of a hybrid-project 
system, in which both permanent organizations and project participants influence future project 
formation. Prior research has outlined key characteristics of this project system, such as industry 
structure (Mezias & Mezias, 2000; Storper, 1989) and project participants' employment patterns 
(Baker & Faulkner, 1991; Bielby & Bielby, 1999; Faulkner & Anderson, 1987; Jones, 1996; 
Zuckerman, Kim, Ukanwa, & Rittman, 2003). Prior project-learning studies have focused on 
effects of accumulated experience on the quality of project outcomes (Moul, 2001) and effects of 
project configurations, such as status differences between participants, on exploration learning 
and innovation (Perretti & Negro, 2007b, 2007a). Importantly, the movie industry during our 
study period differs from later time periods (Miller & Shamsie, 1996; Robins, 1993). Thus, it is 
imperative that we base our work on detailed accounts of practices during the 1930s. 
Accordingly, we describe roles of superordinate permanent organizations (studios) and project 
participants below. 
Superordinate organizations. During our study period, integrated movie studios owned 
substantial production facilities and theater chains. Integrated studios relied to a substantial 
degree on long-term employment contracts with such key project participants as producers, 
directors, actors, art directors, and editors (Weinstein, 1998). Typical contracts granted the studio 
the right to assign most individuals to any movie project, to suspend them if they refused an 
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assignment, and to lend them to other studios. Integrated studios supplemented their substantial 
internal labor force with individuals loaned from other studios and free-lancers hired via short-
term contracts (Davis, 1993; Variety, 1935, July 3: 23). Non-integrated studios and independent 
production companies also had permanent administrative structures to execute movie projects 
and to sell project outcomes, but did not own production facilities or movie theater chains. 
United Artists, a non-integrated studio founded by four extremely successful movie artists, 
engaged participants typically for specific projects (Balio, 1976, 1987), as did Selznick 
International Pictures, an independent production company founded and run by David Selznick 
(Flannery, 1990). In general, non-integrated studios had some consistent internal resources, but 
typically did not enjoy long-term contractual control over project participants and could not bar 
them from joining future projects at other studios. Table 1 provides additional illustrative 
examples for studio control over future project assignments of individual project participants. 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Project participants. In a hybrid-project system not only superordinate organizations, 
but also individual project participants can influence project formation. According to Variety 
(1935, July 3: 23), at least forty acting stars in 1935 were not under long-term contract and could 
accept or reject offers to participate in proposed projects. Some directors avoided work at 
integrated studios to gain more influence over project choice and the selection of other project 
participants (Balio, 1976; Schatz, 1998). Even within the integrated studios, some participants 
influenced future collaboration. Paul Murni (actor) in 1933, for example, signed a two-year 
contract for eight pictures with Warner Brothers that granted him the right of approval for story, 
role, and script (Warner Brothers' Legal Files, 1933). Even less powerful participants could at 
times influence future project participation, as when they avoided taking a part by talking a 
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producer into reporting them as not appropriate (Buscombe, 1994). Table 2 provides additional 
examples of different forms of influence by project participants. 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
HYPOTHESES 
Performance-Outcome Learning in Hybrid-Project Systems 
Movie projects dissolved after task completion and before performance outcome 
information became available. Thus, a movie project could not – as an organizational entity – 
accomplish direct performance-outcome learning from its own experience. The descriptions 
above suggest, however, that entities at two other levels had the potential to use performance 
information to shape future collaboration: studios and individual project participants.  
We follow an established tradition in the learning literature of studying a key learning 
input (project performance) and the predicted learning outcome (future collaboration) based on 
theories of specific learning processes (Argote, 1999). Our approach is deductive, drawing on 
theory to generate hypotheses. We used qualitative and historical information to probe the nature 
of the learning context, to challenge the credibility of the theorized processes, and to illustrate 
specific learning processes -- but not to directly develop theories and not to test theories 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
We view the influence of prior project performance on future collaboration as a special 
case of outcome learning. Performance-outcome learning occurs when performance outcomes 
from an activity influence whether the same activity is repeated (Cyert & March, 1963, 1992). 
Pared to its bones, the performance-outcome learning cycle has three core steps. An organization 
or person takes action A; that action produces result B; the better outcome B is, the greater the 
chances that action A, or elements of A, will be repeated in the future. In contrast, negative 
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outcomes reduce the chance that Action A will be repeated. If project performance influences the 
chances of later collaborations among any of the original participants, performance-outcome 
learning about project-team composition has occurred. 
The crucial feature of performance-outcome learning is that it involves selective 
replication of actions based on performance feedback. This differs profoundly from random 
pairing or from simple momentum processes, which involve the repetition of prior actions 
regardless of performance outcomes (Amburgey & Miner, 1992; Kelly & Amburgey, 1991; 
Miller & Friesen, 1980). Considerable prior research has shown a general tendency toward 
repeated collaboration by various social actors (Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, & Chuang, 2005; Li & 
Rowley, 2002; Soda, Usai, & Zaheer, 2004) -- including movie-project participants during the 
1930s (Zuckerman, 2004). Accordingly, we do not present formal hypotheses about an 
underlying propensity towards repeated collaboration based on either momentum or random 
pairing, but hypothesize instead about how performance outcomes affect future collaboration.  
Given that the project itself cannot carry out a complete learning cycle (acting, observing 
and then repeating its own actions based on outcomes), we develop hypotheses about how 
performance outcomes may influence actions by both superordinate organizations and project 
participants to shape future collaboration. 
Superordinate organizations. At the organizational level two processes can generate 
performance-outcome learning: internal trail-and-error learning and vicarious learning from the 
experience of others (Greve, 1995; Levinthal & March, 1993; Miner & Haunschild, 1995). 
Internal trial-and-error learning has received substantial empirical support. Firms often replicate 
successful product features or development processes (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Miner, 
Bassoff, & Moorman, 2001). The success of prior acquisitions increases the likelihood of future 
acquisitions (Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006). Internal trial-and error learning models in 
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hybrid-project systems imply that superordinate organizations will try to combine again 
participants who produced good results in the organization’s own prior projects (Cyert & March, 
1963).  
Qualitative historical information illustrates studio-level choices to repeat apparently 
successful participant combinations during our study period. For example, Warner Brothers 
teamed up Errol Flynn (actor), Olivia de Havilland (actress), and Michael Curtiz (director) four 
times following the unexpected success of their movie 'Captain Blood' in 1935 (King-Hanson & 
Gevinson, 1993). RKO teamed Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers (actors) in multiple musicals 
because of their successful prior projects and against Astaire’s explicit wishes (Davis, 1993: 
186).  
Beyond internal trial-and-error learning, firms can also learn vicariously by imitating 
actions that produced positive outcomes at other organizations (Conell & Cohn, 1995; 
Haunschild & Miner, 1997; Kraatz, 1998). In a transparent hybrid-project system, superordinate 
organizations can observe outcomes of projects they did not create and try to replicate good 
combinations of participants for their own future projects. For the director Capra's first Warner 
Brothers' movie (‘Meet John Doe’/1941), for example, the studio secured the services of Gary 
Copper and Barbara Stanwyck, who both had starred in prior successful Capra movies at 
Columbia (Schatz, 1998). 
Project participants. Individual participants can also influence future collaboration 
based on outcomes. The notion that individuals repeat behaviors that produce more attractive 
outcomes and avoid behaviors that produce negative outcomes goes back to the very origins of 
learning research in the field of psychology (e.g., Skinner, 1938; Thorndike, 1911). Such 
individual outcome-based learning has since received substantial empirical support in studies 
that also showed how it is constrained by limits of human rationality (Kahneman, Slovic, & 
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Tversky, 1982; Simon, 1955). In addition, group-level research on transactive memory shows 
that participants in any project (successful or not) can develop partner-specific coordination 
routines and knowledge of “who is good at what” (Argote, 1999: 85; Liang, Moreland, & 
Argote, 1995). Higher levels of project performance, however, can enhance participants’ belief 
in the existence and value of such partner-specific routines and knowledge (Argote, 1999), 
leading them to try to collaborate again with the same partners. 
In the movie context, historical data illustrates that individual producers, directors, and 
actors could all influence the choice of future collaboration partners under certain conditions. As 
the examples in Table 2 show, producers and directors at times took steps to reassemble pairings 
from previously successful projects. Actors too sometimes decided whether to work on a future 
project, given other anticipated participants. Mae West, for example, eventually simply refused 
to work together with W. C. Fields because of his abusive behavior (King-Hanson & Gevinson, 
1993).  
Overall, then, learning theory suggests that both superordinate organizations and 
individual participants will engage in performance-outcome learning in a hybrid-project system. 
The exemplars above illustrate ways in which this process could occur in our setting. We are 
neutral about the relative influence of superordinate organizations and project participants. 
Instead, we test for the overall effect of project performance on future collaboration with the 
same partners in this and in the following hypotheses. 
H1: Higher levels of project performance will have a positive effect on the number of future 
project collaborations between project participants.  
Perceived Relevance as Moderator of Performance Impact in Hybrid-Project Systems 
The successful completion of the performance-outcome learning cycle in any setting is 
contingent on three conditions: awareness of performance outcomes, attribution of the outcome 
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to some particular aspect of prior behavior, and ability to use this knowledge to select the next 
round of action (Cyert & March, 1963, 1992; Levitt & March, 1988; March & Olsen, 1976). The 
same conditions are required for performance-outcome learning in hybrid-project systems, but 
this setting highlights several potential moderators that may affect the learning cycle.  
We chose a research setting in which the key project-performance indicator (boxoffice 
revenue) was widely accepted and easily available to industry members (Powdermaker, 1950; 
Stuart, 1982). This allowed us to focus on other conditions moderating performance impact. 
Even when everyone has access to performance information, bounded rationality and ambiguity 
about the causes of project performance or the applicability of actions of a prior project to future 
projects can disrupt the completion of performance-outcome learning cycles. In order for a prior 
project to provide input information for the proposed learning cycle, this prior project must be 
noticed and the information must be considered decision relevant (Kim & Miner, 2007). In 
Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c, we propose that prior collaboration (especially if more recent) and 
projects of a same type (color movies here) will increase perceived relevance and enhance 
performance impact on future collaboration.  
Prior Collaborations. This hypothesis focuses on the potential interaction effect 
between any history of previous collaborations and a focal project’s performance outcome. 
Specifically, does the impact of project A’s performance on future collaborations with the same 
partners depend on whether there were previous collaborations between the same partners even 
before project A? We propose that prior collaborations will enhance the positive effect of project 
performance because they enhance the perceived relevance of project performance through two 
sub-processes.  
First, the prior collaborations increase the salience or visibility of a project. Simon’s 
(1955) and related research (Cyert & March, 1963; Kahneman et al., 1982) show convincingly 
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that decision-making is constrained by the limited attentional capabilities of individuals and 
organizations. Prior collaborations among the same participants increase the odds that their latest 
project’s positive or negative outcome is noticed by participants or organizations considering the 
same participants for a future project (March, Sproull, & Tamuz, 1991; Ocasio, 1997) -- 
especially in settings where the number of projects is high. Consistent with this argument, large 
scale studies of vicarious organizational learning have shown the impact of highly visible events 
(Kim & Miner, 2007). 
Second, prior collaborations will likely influence the interpretation of project 
performance, including the attribution of higher levels of performance to combinations of 
participants. Movie performance can result from many factors such as plot, visual impact, acting 
performances, and distribution timing. Better project performance tends to confirm beliefs by 
participants or studios that valuable shared routines and complementarities were developed or 
discovered during prior collaborations. Prior collaborations before a focal project increase the 
chances that a project's performance is attributed to the combinations of participants. Historical 
data illustrates the development of such complementary skills and shared knowledge -- 
supporting the general feasibility of our hypothesized effect. For example, William Wyler 
(director) reported that Gregg Toland’s (camera) ability to keep actors visible in both foreground 
and background influenced Wyler’s directorial approach in ways he highly valued, which led to 
repeated collaborations (Davis, 1993: 238).  
Combined salience and attribution arguments imply that prior collaborations before a 
focal project will increase the perceived relevance of its performance for future collaboration 
choices with the same partners. Prior collaborations should strengthen the impact of project 
performance -- a supplemental interaction effect. This prediction extends related research by Li 
and Rowley’s (2002) that showed main effects for both prior collaboration history and prior 
 13 
collaboration performance on future collaboration between the same investment banks, but did 
not test their interaction. It also contrasts with Haleblian et al. (2006)’s findings that performance 
and prior experience reduced each other’s impact in the context of repeated acquisition behavior. 
Both studies explored behavior based on an enduring firm’s own internal experience, however, 
rather than the cross-level and cross-organizational learning processes we examine. Our 
theoretical reasoning implies the following supplemental interaction for hybrid-project settings: 
H2a: The greater the number of prior collaborations between the same project participants, the 
stronger the positive effect of higher levels of project performance on the number of future 
project collaborations between the same project participants. 
Recency of prior collaborations. We argue that recent prior collaborations are more 
likely to be perceived as relevant for two reasons. First, recent events are often more easily and 
vividly recalled making them more salient and more likely to be perceived (March et al., 1991; 
Ocasio, 1997). Thus, participants and superordinate organizations are more likely to pay 
attention to project-performance outcomes from recent collaborations than from earlier 
collaborations when considering choices about future collaborations. Second, in some settings, 
recent collaborations can provide more relevant information precisely because they are closer in 
time to a future project. This will occur, especially, in dynamic project systems where customers’ 
preferences, competitors’ behavior, and contributor capabilities change frequently, like for 
example in entertainment, fashion, or advertising industries (Grabher, 2004). In such dynamic 
settings, recent collaborations may be perceived more relevant, as ‘recipes for success’ and 
knowledge gained from prior collaborations are assumed to depreciate quickly. In the movie 
industry, observers highlighted the feasibility of such short-term orientations (Rosten, 1941) as 
captured in the industry saying: "A man [woman] is only as good as his [her] latest picture" 
(Powdermaker, 1950: 36). Consistent with these arguments, considerable empirical evidence has 
supported a stronger impact of recent events and experiences compared to older experiences -- 
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all else being equal (Argote, 1999; Baum & Ingram, 1998; Darr, Argote, & Epple, 1995).  
Taken together, these arguments suggest that more recent projects have a higher 
perceived relevance, which results in a stronger moderating effect compared to older joint 
collaborations. 
H2b: More recent prior collaborations between the same project participants will have a 
stronger positive moderating effect on the relationship between higher levels of project 
performance and the number of future project collaborations between the same 
participants. 
Project-type similarity. This hypothesis predicts that project similarity is another factor 
that will enhance perceived relevance, and hence increase the impact of performance on future 
collaboration. During our study period, color movies introduced an important new type of 
project. The innovative color technology required substantial adjustments of how participants 
performed their interdependent tasks. The lighting of color scenes, for example, affected 
costumes and stage design, requiring close coordination and experimentation by the director, 
cinematographer, and the art director (Holden, 1937: 242). The art directors Malcom Bert and 
Gene Allen, for example, reported how they developed valuable shared knowledge when they 
collaborated with a specific color consultant, George Hoyningen-Huene, during the production 
of a later color movie (‘A Star Is Born’/WB 1954). They reported that: "[W]e interchanged and 
just talked and thought of things. He was terribly creative and helpful, and so we formed a sort of 
partnership." (Harver, 1988). The belief in such valuable shared knowledge by studios or 
individuals, then, suggests an increase in the likelihood of repeat collaborations of the same 
participants in similar type projects independent of performance outcomes (Faulkner, 1983; 
Schatz, 1994; Zuckerman et al., 2003). 
We propose that in addition to this unconditional repeated collaboration tendency, project 
similarity will increase the impact of project performance, again creating a supplemental 
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interaction for two reasons. First, the performance of a specialized type of movie will be more 
salient and visible, when participants contemplate partner choices or superordinate organizations 
assign participants for a future project of similar type (Holland & Miller, 1991; March et al., 
1991). This argument is consistent with research findings that organizations producing visible 
outputs in similar settings receive closer attention (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1995; Lant & Phelps, 
1999) -- and are more likely the source for vicarious performance-outcome learning (Haunschild 
& Miner, 1997; Kim & Miner, 2007).  
Second, these tendencies will be especially strong when individual participants or 
superordinate organizations believe that a new project will benefit from collaborative practices 
specific to the project type. Empirical research on the individual, group, and organization level 
has supported the notion that the value of experience often depends on particular match between 
task conditions and individuals (Argote, 1999; Austin, 2003; Hutchins, 1991). Historical movie 
data describes similar beliefs among project participants and studios that some specific 
knowledge developed in prior collaborations will be valuable only in future projects of a similar 
type (Crafton, 1997; Powdermaker, 1950; Zuckerman et al., 2003). Such industry beliefs in 
project-type specific complementarities and higher salience of prior projects of similar type both 
imply a higher perceived relevance of project performance for future projects of a similar type. 
H2c: A focal project's higher level of performance will have a stronger positive effect on the 
number of future project collaborations between the same participants when the focal and 
future projects are of the same type. 
Organizational Power as Moderator of Performance Impact in Hybrid-Project Systems 
Our last hypothesis proposes that organizational power asymmetry will play a key role in 
the completion of performance-outcome learning cycles. Early theoretical work on 
organizational learning deliberately highlighted its distinctness from power and other key causal 
process models. Levitt and March (1988: 319), for example, stated that “Theories of 
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organizational learning can be distinguished from … theories of conflict and bargaining which 
emphasize strategic action, power, and exchange.” Although it was important initially to clarify 
the distinct focus of organizational learning, we argue that political processes and power can 
shape contours of performance-outcome learning and offer an important theoretical frontier. 
Following the initial work on organizational power, we define it in this context as the ability of 
an organizational entity to control decisions and outcomes (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974). 
In a hybrid system, by definition, more than one party can potentially shape the 
composition of future project teams. In our research context, both studios and individuals 
influenced future collaboration. Relative power over participants differed across types of studios, 
however. Integrated studios maintained considerable control over the participants based on long-
term employment contracts. This created closed organizations with an internal labor pool that 
others could not raid. In contrast, non-integrated studios represented open organizations that 
were not able to block participants from joining future projects at other studios. This difference 
in institutional control created a power asymmetry that provided an integrated studio more 
opportunities to influence future collaborations of its project participants compared to non-
integrated studios. This power asymmetry contrasts with the frequent assumption in several 
literatures that potential partners freely choose each other. For example, labor market research 
often assumes that individual employees and employers can freely choose each other 
(Granovetter, 1995; Stigler, 1962). Similarly, research on interorganizational alliance formation 
often assumes that organizations can freely choose potential partners (Das & Teng, 2000; Gulati 
& Gargiulo, 1999).  
In contrast, we predict that organizational power plays a key role in how performance-
outcome learning affects repeated collaboration in hybrid-project systems. The causal process is 
simple. A complete performance-outcome learning cycle requires that any learning entity has the 
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power to recreate combinations of participants that it believes valuable. In the absence of power 
asymmetries, we expect all organizations to recruit equally across organizational boundaries and 
participants to choose freely which future projects they join. In a hybrid-project system with 
power asymmetries, however, participants in projects of open organizations can cross 
organizational boundaries at will. But at least some participants in projects of closed 
organizations are blocked from working in future projects of other organizations. In our study, 
non-integrated studios represent open organizations. Integrated studios, with their preference for 
long-term employment, represent closed organizations.  
We predict that these power asymmetries create parts of the system where vicarious 
performance-outcome learning occurs and other areas in which prior project performance will 
have a weaker or no effect. All studios can observe the performance of projects at other studios, 
but if a successful project occurred at an integrated studio (closed organization), other studios 
encounter more obstacles to replicate that valuable combinations of participants because the 
integrated studios will block its contributors (or at least some of them) from participating in 
outside projects. In contrast, successful combinations of participants will be more likely 
replicated by a different studio if the successful project occurred at a non-integrated studio (open 
organization).  The organizational control over project participants will moderate the impact of 
project performance.  
H3: For future projects governed by a different organization, a focal project’s higher level of 
performance will have a stronger positive effect on the number of future collaborations 
between the same participants if the focal project was governed by an 'open' organization 
compared to a ‘closed’ organization. 
METHODS AND MEASURES 
Sample and Setting 
The U.S. movie industry in the 1930’s provides an excellent context for testing our 
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hypotheses. Project participants dispersed at task completion. Industry publications 
communicated project performance and the names of key project participants. The setting as a 
whole exemplifies a hybrid-project system, in which both superordinate organizations (studios) 
and individual project participants influenced later collaboration. The specific degrees of control 
over project participants varied across studios.  
Feature movies produced during this time fall into two distinct categories. High-budget 
A-movies were carefully crafted entertainment products targeted at high box-office revenues. In 
contrast, low-budget B-movies were quickly and efficiently created for predictable, but lower 
box-office returns. A-movie and B-movie production requirements were so distinctly different 
that they represented two separate production systems. According to Taves (1993), individuals 
once identified with either production system tended to get pigeonholed. We focus on the 
production of A-movies because of their better archival documentation. We identified A-movies 
based on a production time of more than three weeks, at least two-star credits, and a minimum 
cast size of ten (Taves, 1993). 
We randomly sampled 239 A-movie projects based on production announcements in the 
Hollywood Reporter  (1930-present) covering the time period 1931-1940. Movies after 1940 
were not sampled to minimize disruptive effects of World War II. Movies before 1931 were not 
sampled because of incomplete production announcements.  
We developed our hypotheses from theories of learning. Learning research often faces 
considerable challenges observing learning processes directly, which enhances the importance of 
a careful understanding of the learning context. For this reason, we performed an extensive 
review of historical qualitative data from contemporary industry publications (Variety, 1931-
1940; Hollywood Reporter, 1931-1940; Motion Picture Herald, 1931-1940), a contemporary 
ethnography of movie production (Powdermaker, 1950), preserved studio records (Glancy, 1992, 
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1995; Warner Brothers' Legal Files, 1933), oral histories of industry participants (Davis, 1993; 
Naumburg, 1937; Schickel, 1975), case studies of specific movie projects (Harmetz, 1978; 
Roddick, 1983), and historical investigations of movie production in general (Balio, 1987, 1993; 
Schatz, 1988). We used the resulting qualitative data to challenge proposed learning processes 
and to check the face validity of our measures. We also used anecdotal information to illustrate 
hypothesized learning activities in the presentation of our theory-based hypotheses.  
Dependent Variable: Future Collaboration 
Relationship dyads are the fundamental unit of social interaction (Simmel, 1902). 
Consistent with prior learning research in movie settings (Perretti & Negro, 2007b, 2007a), we 
focused on relationship dyads of the producer and director with key creative and technical 
project participants. We selected relationships that are crucial for the coordination of 
interdependent activities during movie production (Powdermaker, 1950; Roddick, 1983). We 
excluded screenwriters because their main contribution occurs during pre-production. Our 
measure captures the following twelve dyadic relationships: producer-director, producer-actor 
#1, producer-actor #2, director-actor #1, director-actor #2, producer-cinematographer, director-
cinematographer, producer-art director, director-art director, producer-editor, director-editor, and 
actor #1-actor #2. Our measure accounts for the central coordinating role of producer and 
director during the execution of movie projects (Harmetz, 1978; Naumburg, 1937).  
We used the American Film Institute Catalog (King-Hanson & Gevinson, 1993) and the 
Internet Movie Database (www.imdb.com) to determine project participants. Our Future 
Collaboration measure captures the number of repeated dyadic relationships during the four 
years after project completion (mean=15.01; S.D.=11.95). For example, the movie ‘Radio City 
Revels’ (RKO, Production: 11/15 - 12/25/1937; Release: 2/11/1938) led to the following two 
future movie projects that combined some of the same key contributors. First, 'The Affairs of 
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Annabel’ (RKO/September 1938) reunited the director Ben Stoloff, the lead actor Jack Oakie, 
and art director Van Nest Polglase. This implies the replication of two dyadic relationships: 
Director-Actor #1 and Director-Art Director. Second, ‘The Marines Fly High’ (RKO/March 
1940) combined director Ben Stoloff again with Art Director Van Nest Polglase. The measure 
Future Collaboration (Periods 1 to 4) for ‘Radio City Revels’ has the value of 3.  
For the project similarity hypothesis (H2c), we constructed a similar future collaboration 
measure that only captured repeated collaborations in future color movies (mean=1.19; 
S.D.=2.92). For the power hypothesis (H3), we captured repeated collaboration in future projects 
governed by a different studio (mean=1.01; S.D.=2.77).  
We picked a four-year time window after the start of movie production. Short time 
windows of less than two years made little sense considering that it took several months till 
movie release and another couple of months till boxoffice performance was known. We also 
considered that participants may have committed or been assigned to their next project before 
project performance was known. Consequently, we expected the effect of project performance to 
be several projects in the future. At the same time, the longer the time window, the more likely 
future employment was affected by the outcomes of subsequent projects. Repeated collaboration  
patterns for producers, directors, and actors in prior research suggested at least a three-year time 
window after movie release (Zuckerman, 2004). We picked a slightly longer time window (four 
years) to compensate for the several months that our movie production date preceded movie 
release. We confirmed the robustness of our findings for 2, 3, and 5 year windows.  
Independent Variables 
Project performance. During the 1930s, box-office returns provided the primary source 
of movie revenue because the period predates revenue opportunities through merchandising, TV 
release, or video release (Stuart, 1982). Several industry publications communicated project 
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performance. We used U.S. box-office information reported by contemporary trade journals 
called Boxoffice (1932-1977) and Boxoffice Barometer (1937-1951). These journals surveyed 
first-run movie theater operators weekly across the United States. Theater operators evaluated a 
movie’s box-office performance in percent compared to the expected box-office of an average 
movie. This project performance measure is continuous and always positive with an average 
box-office return being rated as 100%. On average, the sampled movies received a 104.57% 
performance evaluation (S.D.=18.66). Missing data required estimation of performance values 
for 16 movies based on information from the Motion Picture Herald (1931-1940). Dummy 
variables control for any fixed effects related to the different sources for performance 
information. Although first-run theaters comprised only about 25% of total movie-theater seating 
capacity, they returned 50-75% of the box-office receipts and influenced movie booking 
decisions of second-run theaters (Balio, 1987; Huettig, 1985). Available revenue information 
from studio accounting records (Glancy, 1992, 1995) was strongly correlated with the box-office 
ratings by theater operators (r=.76; p<.001). This corroborates the value of our Project 
Performance measure.  
Prior collaboration. Industry publications and on-screen credits communicated names of 
project participants. We used the same coding rules described for future collaboration to capture 
prior collaborations between the same key participants. We examined prior collaborations during 
the same year, and each of the four years preceding the focal movie project (mean=16.73; 
S.D.=14.76). We confirmed the robustness of our findings for 3, 4, and 6 year windows. 
In the absence of strong prior research evidence to determine an appropriate depreciation 
factor, we employed a simple and intuitive split-group approach to test the impact of more recent 
collaboration. For this purpose, we created the variables Prior Collaborations (Periods -2 to 0) 
and Prior Collaborations (Periods -5 to-3). Both capture prior collaborations for three-year 
 22 
periods. 
Project-type similarity and studio type. We identified color movies (dummy coded ‘1’; 
mean=.03; S.D.=.16) and the producing studio based on the American Film Institute Catalog 
(King-Hanson & Gevinson, 1993). We coded as non-integrated studios: United Artists, minor 
studios, and independent production companies (dummy coded '1'; mean=.08; S.D.=.27).  
Control variables. Our baseline models control for differences in project inputs at the 
participant level (number of prior movies and academy nominations for each key non-cast 
participant and the top three cast members) and the project level (number of cast star credits, 
number of days in production, and cast size). The null hypothesis of our investigations is that 
project performance has no systematic effect on future collaborations either directly or 
moderated by the impact of other variables. Consequently, different levels of random matching, 
for example, because of a smaller or larger pool of potential project participants, will ceteris 
paribus not affect our tests -- because they are random.  
However, if higher levels of project performance increase the activity level of individual 
contributors (number of projects per year), this could influence the likelihood of a future 
collaboration between the same participants based on random matching processes. To control for 
this potential indirect effect, our models (H1-H2b) use the number of future projects of each 
individual contributor as a proxy for differences in activity level.1 Our results are robust to the 
inclusion or exclusion of this variable. In the models testing hypotheses about repeated 
collaborations for color movies (H2c) and studio type (H3), we control for differences in activity 
level based on the total number of repeated ties between the participants in any type of future 
movie project. Controlling for future activity levels, however, introduces potential 
multicollinearity and endogeneity concerns. We addressed the former by using hierarchical 
                                                 
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for prompting us to explore this issue in more depth. 
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regression analyses. We probed for effects of the latter by dropping the controls for differences 
in activity levels, which did not affect reported results. We report the more conservative models 
with controls for differences in activity levels. 
Additional dummy variables control for any fixed effects of producing studio, year of 
production, movie genre (drama, musical, and comedy), incomplete participant information, and 
release quarter. Table 3 provides a list of all control variables and their respective data sources. 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------  
Analyses and Model Development 
Our main dependent variable, Future Collaboration, is a count variable. After confirming 
the robustness of our results using negative binomial and poisson regression (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 1998), we report OLS results in this paper for two reasons.2 First, the specific features of 
our data do not display some of the major concerns related to using OLS. For example, the mean 
of our dependent variable Future Collaboration is substantially different from zero 
(mean=15.01; S.D.=11.95), there are few cases with a value of zero, and the distribution shows 
normal tendencies. Second, the robustness of our findings across different model specifications 
enables us to take advantage of the fact that OLS permits a more straightforward marginal 
analysis of moderated effects central to our theoretical focus (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 
2003; Jaccard et al., 1990). Accordingly, we chose to report the more intuitive and less complex 
OLS results. In order to control for potential heteroscedasticity, we used Huber/White robust 
standard errors for our significance tests (White, 1980). Our conditional analyses of interaction 
hypotheses do not require mean centering (Cohen et al., 2003). Thus, we avoided score 
transformations of our meaningful and externally determined scales to facilitate the interpretation 
                                                 
2 Results of additional analyses are available from the first author upon request. 
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of our results (Townsend & Ashby, 1984).  
We use hierarchical regression analysis to test for hypothesized interaction effects.  In 
several models, we have to draw on prior models to construct complete interaction terms that 
accurately reflected our theoretical predictions. For example, we hypothesized a positive 
interaction between project performance and prior collaboration. If supported, this has 
implications for our later tests of moderated project-performance effects across different project 
types (color vs. black-and-white) and different studio types (non-integrated vs. integrated). In 
those later models, it thus becomes necessary to interact project type and studio type, not only 
with project performance, but also with the interaction of project performance and prior 
collaboration to account for their synergistic effect. If hierarchical regression analysis supports 
the resulting three-way interactions, this suggests that the corresponding two-way interactions 
should also be included in the full model (Aiken & West, 1991). We report two-tailed 
significance for all regression coefficients in our tables. For the conditional analyses of specific 
directional hypotheses, we report one-tailed significance tests. 
RESULTS 
Descriptives and model development. Table 4 reports the means, standard deviations, 
and correlation coefficients for the theoretical variables. We follow three steps to assess 
interaction effects. First, we compare model fit with and without interaction effects for any given 
model in order to pick the best model for interpretation. If the evidence supports an interaction 
effect, we assess coefficients in the full model, and analyze the impact of a given variable at 
three levels of the moderator with which it interacts (conditional analysis). We use the mean, one 
standard deviation below the mean and one standard deviation above the mean as reasonable 
moderator values (Aiken & West, 1991). This is consistent with emerging approaches to 
assessing interaction effects where separately interpreting variables in models without the 
 25 
interaction terms is not encouraged (Cohen et al., 2003). Finally, to help interpret these analyses, 
we provide graphic representations of the interaction pattern.   
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 5 shows regression results for the effects of project performance and prior 
collaboration on future collaborations. Model 4 adds to Model 3 the hypothesized interaction 
between project performance and prior collaboration, which significantly improves model fit (Δ 
R2=.011; p<.05). Thus, hierarchical regression analysis suggests that Model 3 is underspecified. 
Conditional analyses based on Model 4 should be used to test Hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b. 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Interaction of prior collaborations with project performance (H1, H2a). We 
proposed that prior collaborations before a focal project enhance the impact of that project’s 
performance on later collaborations (H2a). As noted, adding the interaction term for performance 
and prior collaboration significantly improves model fit (Table 5, Model 4: Δ R2=.011; p<.05). 
The coefficient for the interaction term is in the hypothesized direction and significant (b=.0042; 
p<.01). To further probe the nature of the moderated project performance effects, we calculated 
estimates of change in future collaboration, given a marginal change in project performance. 
Appendix A contains the corresponding partial derivative equations for all conditional analyses. 
The following coefficients show the impact of a marginal change in project performance (PERF) 
on future collaboration (FCt=1 to 4) -- [∂(FCt=1 to 4)/ ∂(PERF)]. We evaluate this at low, mean and 
high levels of prior collaborations (PCt=-4 to 0). Standard errors are shown in parentheses along 
with one-tailed significance tests for our directional hypotheses. 
[∂(FCt=1 to 4)/ ∂(PERF) | at PCt=-4 to 0=1.97]  = .032     (.042) (Prior collaborations low) 
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[∂(FCt=1 to 4)/ ∂(PERF) | at PCt=-4 to 0=16.73]  = .094*   (.038) (Prior collaborations at mean) 
[∂(FCt=1 to 4)/ ∂(PERF) | at PCt=-4 to 0=31.49]  = .155** (.044) (Prior collaborations high) 
These conditional analyses show that the sensitivity of future movie collaborations to past 
project performance depends upon prior levels of collaboration. Project performance has a 
significant positive effect on future collaborations between the same partners when prior 
collaborations are at the mean or high (b=.094; p<.05 and b=.155; p<.01; one-tailed). The 
positive impact is contingent on at least average levels of prior collaboration. These findings 
support a conditional positive moderating effect of prior collaborations. The lack of any effect of 
project performance at low levels of prior collaboration rejects unconditional performance-
outcome learning as hypothesized in H1. The positive impact at higher levels supports H2 which 
argued that prior collaboration will increase the impact of performance. Figure 1 shows the 
three-dimensional graph of the contingent effect. 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Interaction of recent prior collaborations with project-performance (H2b). We 
proposed that recent prior collaborations will have a stronger positive effect than older 
collaborations. Model 6 in Table 5 includes two separated interaction terms Project Performance 
x Prior Collaborations (Periods -2 to 0) and Project Performance x Prior Collaborations 
(Periods -5 to-3). These terms yield a significant model improvement over Model 5 (Δ R2=.017; 
p<.05). However, only the interaction term for recent collaborations Project Performance x 
Prior Collaborations (Periods -2 to 0) is statistically significant (Model 6: b=.007; p<.001). 
Comparing Model 8 and Model 6 reveals that adding old Prior Collaborations (Periods -5 to -3) 
and its respective interaction term does not significantly improve model fit (Δ R2=.004; p=.435). 
These results support H2b that more recent prior collaborations have a stronger positive 
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moderating effect. In fact, only the recent collaborations mattered. Thus, we use the Prior 
Collaborations (Period -2 to 0) measure in all subsequent models. However, the reported results 
are robust for the Prior Collaborations (Periods -4 to 0) measure. 
Interaction of project-type similarity with project performance (H2c). We 
hypothesized that the effects of project performance on future color movie collaborations will be 
stronger if the focal project is a color movie. Our support for H2a shows that effects of project 
performance on future collaborations are moderated by prior collaborations. Thus, we interacted 
the color movie variable with project performance, prior collaboration, and their interaction term. 
Time dummies control for the diffusion of the color technology.  
Model 2 in Table 6 replicates our standard model containing Project Performance, Prior 
Collaborations (Periods -2 to 0), and their interaction term. Model 3 adds a main effect for a 
color movie. Model 4 introduces the respective two-way interactions: Color Movie x Project 
Performance, and Color Movie x Prior Collaborations. Model 5 adds the three-way interaction 
that accounts for any difference across project types with regard to the earlier supported Project 
Performance x Prior Collaboration interaction (H2a). The three-way interaction term 
significantly improves model fit (∆  R2=.023; p<.001). The support for this higher-level 
interaction suggests the inclusion of corresponding lower-level interaction terms (Aiken & West, 
1991; Cohen et al., 2003). Thus, hierarchical regression analysis suggests Model 5 to examine 
the hypothesized conditional effects.  
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
H2c implies that a focal movie's performance will have a stronger effect on future color 
collaborations (FCCt=1 to 4), if the focal movie is a color movie. To test this hypothesis, we 
estimate conditional change in Project Performance (PERF) for a focal Color Movie (CM=1) 
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and compare it to the conditional performance effects for a focal black-and-white movie 
(CM=0). The corresponding conditional analyses also account for the moderating effects of 
Prior Collaborations (PCt=-2 to 0). 
[∂(FCCt=1 to 4)/ ∂(PERF) | at CM=1, PCt=-2 to 0=1.48] = .319*** (.061)   (Color, Prior Coll. low) 
[∂(FCCt=1 to 4)/ ∂(PERF) | at CM=1, PCt=-2 to 0=13.18] = .189*** (.055)   (Color, Prior Coll. at mean) 
[∂(FCCt=1 to 4)/ ∂(PERF) | at CM=1, PCt=-2 to 0=24.87] = .059       (.059)   (Color, Prior Coll. high)  
 [∂(FCCt=1 to 4)/ ∂(PERF) | at CM=0, PCt=-2 to 0=1.48] = .015        (.012)   (B&W, Prior Coll. low) 
[∂(FCCt=1 to 4)/ ∂(PERF) | at CM=0, PCt=-2 to 0=13.18] = .030**    (.009)   (B&W, Prior Coll. at mean) 
[∂(FCCt=1 to 4)/ ∂(PERF) | at CM=0, PCt=-2 to 0=24.87] = .045**    (.016)   (B&W, Prior Coll. high) 
 
Higher levels of project performance in either a color or a black-and-white movie tend to 
increase significantly the chances of joint collaboration in a future color movie for four of six 
conditions. H2c predicted that project performance has a stronger effect when the focal movie 
was of the same type (color). Consistent with this hypothesis, the conditional regression 
coefficient estimates for color movies are all larger compared to the performance effect estimates 
for black-and-white movies. For a formal test, we evaluated the significance of the regression 
coefficient differences at each of the three levels of prior collaboration (Judge, Griffiths, Hill, 
Luetkepohl, & Lee, 1985; StataCorp., 2007: 267-273). Color-movie performance has a 
significantly stronger positive effect when the levels of prior collaboration is average (Δb=.159; 
p<.01) or low (Δb=.304; p<.001). At high levels of prior collaboration, the performance effect 
difference is not significant (Δb=.014; n.s.). These results support H2c. Figure 2 shows 
graphically how project performance has a stronger effect when the focal movie was of the same 
type (color) as the later movie.  
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Interaction of organizational power and project performance (H3). This hypothesis 
predicted that higher levels of project performance in a non-integrated studio production will 
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have a stronger positive effect on the number of future project collaborations governed by a 
different studio compared to higher levels of project performance in an integrated studio 
production. Non-integrated studios lacked the control over project participants to block their 
future collaboration with other studios. In contrast, integrated studios possessed such control. 
Thus, we expect a weaker effect of project performance for projects governed by an integrated 
studio.  
We first checked the validity of our assumption about asymmetric studio control. For 
integrated studios, the number of future collaborations governed by a different studio was 
significantly lower than the number expected based on random future project assignments. For 
non-integrated studios there was no such significant difference (for further details see Appendix 
B). This pattern is consistent with our assumption of asymmetric control between integrated and 
non-integrated studios. 
The baseline Model 2 in Table 7 reports the effects of our standard control and 
independent variables on Future Collaborations Governed by a Different Studio (FCDSt=1 to 4) -- 
plus our proxy for differences in overall activity level -- the participants' total number of Future 
Collaborations (FCt=1 to 4). Model 3 adds the Non-Integrated Studio (NIS) dummy (∆ R2=.046; 
p<.001). Model 4 introduces interactions of the non-integrated studio variable with Project 
Performance (PERF) and with Prior Collaborations (PCt=-2 to 0) (∆ R2=.057; p<.001). Model 5 
adds the three-way interaction that accounts for any difference across studio types with regard to 
the earlier supported Project Performance x Prior Collaboration interaction (H2a). Hierarchical 
regression analyses supports the three-way interaction (∆ R2=.054; p<.001) and suggests 
conditional analyses based on Model 5.  
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Each focal movie project was produced in one of the two studio types. For each project,  
we estimate changes in future collaboration outside of that studio, given marginal change in 
performance for reasonable levels of prior collaboration. 
[∂(FCDSt=1 to 4)/ ∂(PERF) | at NIS=1, PCt=-2 to 0=1.48]   =  .012        (.033) (Non-integrated, Prior Coll. low) 
[∂(FCDSt=1 to 4)/ ∂(PERF) | at NIS=1, PCt=-2 to 0=13.18] =  .523***  (.124) (Non-integrated, Prior Coll. mean) 
[∂(FCDSt=1 to 4)/ ∂(PERF) | at NIS=1, PCt=-2 to 0=24.87] = 1.034*** (.262) (Non-integrated, Prior Coll. high) 
[∂(FCDSt=1 to 4)/ ∂(PERF) | at NIS=0, PCt=-2 to 0=1.48]   =  -.007       (.007) (Integrated, Prior Coll. low) 
[∂(FCDSt=1 to 4)/ ∂(PERF) | at NIS=0, PCt=-2 to 0=13.18] =  -.010       (.007) (Integrated, Prior Coll. mean) 
[∂(FCDSt=1 to 4)/ ∂(PERF) | at NIS=0, PCt=-2 to 0=24.87] =  -.012       (.008) (Integrated, Prior Coll. high) 
H3 predicted that performance will have a stronger effect for movie projects governed by 
non-integrated studios compared to movie projects governed by an integrated studio. Our results 
indicate that statistically significant project performance effects occurred only for focal projects 
at non-integrated studios. For a formal test of H3, we evaluated for each of the three levels of 
prior collaboration the statistical significance of difference between the performance effect 
estimates for projects governed by a non-integrated studio vs. projects governed by integrated 
studio. These tests show that performance of projects governed by a non-integrated studio have a 
significantly stronger positive effect at average (Δb=.533; p<.001) and high (Δb=1.046; p<.001) 
levels of prior collaboration. At low levels of prior collaboration, the performance effect 
difference is not significant (Δb=.005; n.s.). Thus, H3 is supported: Higher levels of performance 
in a focal project at a non-integrated studio significantly increased the chances of future 
collaboration at a different studio. Higher levels of project performance at an integrated studio 
had no such effect. Figure 3 shows graphically how studio type shaped the impact of project 
performance. 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 




Taken as a whole, our results support the proposed contingency approach to 
performance-outcome learning in hybrid-project systems. Consistent with our causal theories, 
Figures 1, 2, and 3 underscore that recent prior collaboration, similar project type, and 
organizational power all shape whether and how project performance leads to repeated project 
collaboration. In the following sections, we will first discuss how these results advance our 
understanding of project systems, before we explore the contributions of our findings to theories 
of organizational learning. Following considerations of study limitations, we then close by 
speculating on the implications of our findings for the adaptive value of hybrid-project systems.  
Project Systems 
The predominant body of work on collaboration and networks tends to emphasize long-
term and open-ended collaborations (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Uzzi, 1997). In 
contrast, our study advances research of short-term project systems in two key ways. First, our 
study deepens the conceptual tools for probing the varieties of such systems by introducing and 
illustrating key features of hybrid-project systems. Second, our study proposes and tests the 
impact of specific causal processes and constraints that will drive the patterns of collaboration in 
such systems. Thus, our study offers new theoretical insights, while underscoring the value of 
further related work.  
Features of hybrid-project systems. We defined a hybrid-project system as a setting in 
which several organizations govern projects, at least some participants can cross organizational 
boundaries, and both organizations and participants can influence project formation. We 
provided descriptive illustrative material of such a system based on the studio era of the U.S. 
movie industry. Although such systems have long existed, systematic scholarly attention has 
only been more recent (Sydow et al., 2004).  
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Theoretically our framework underscores that project systems can vary substantially in 
levels and degrees of control over repeated collaboration. At one extreme, a system of short-term 
projects can operate in which each project stands alone with no superordinate organization, as 
seen in studies of independent movie productions (e.g., Baker & Faulkner, 1991; Jones, 1996) or 
IPO syndicates (e.g., Li & Rowley, 2002). At the other extreme, projects can be fully embedded 
in a single higher-level organization that controls what projects are initiated and who joins them -
- for example, internal research and development projects (Hansen, 1999; Katz, 1982). Hybrid-
project systems cover the important middle ground between these extreme constellations. Our 
descriptive material goes beyond noting the existence of such systems by illustrating some of its 
key features. Our quantitative analyses indicate how the impact of ongoing processes can vary 
depending on the specific balance of organizational and individual control in the system. 
Careful assessment of the specific balances within a hybrid-project system is increasingly 
important as outsourcing and limited-term employment have created more of such systems 
combining participant, superordinate organizations, and asymmetries of power between 
organizations (Arthur & Rousseau, 1996; Zenger & Hesterly, 1997). Employees of firms who 
previously worked only on in-house project teams may now participate in R&D projects that 
contain members from multiple firms (Sakakibara, 2002). Our work implies that processes 
involving both higher and lower-level actors in such systems, and variations in organizational 
control over project formation both represent important dimensions not only for our 
identification, but also for our understanding of such systems.  
Patterns of collaboration in hybrid-project systems. Beyond developing the construct 
of hybrid-project systems and outlining its key characteristics, our study introduces a conditional 
framework that outlines how repeated collaboration unfolds in such systems. This framework 
proposes specific constraints and distinct causal processes based on theories of organizational 
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learning and the impact of organizational power. Specifically, we hypothesized that perceived 
relevance of performance information and organizational control over project participants 
determine whether and how project performance shapes future collaboration patterns. The study's 
systematic quantitative data and analyses support this framework. Thus, our results of 
collaboration patterns in hybrid-project systems also offer insights for two important emerging 
domains in the organizational learning literature: moderated performance-outcome learning and 
the impact of organizational power on learning. The following section discusses the broader 
implications of our findings for organizational learning research. 
Organizational Learning 
Moderated performance-outcome learning. We theorized that even if outcomes are 
clear, considerable ambiguity remains in many settings concerning what actually generated a 
favored outcome. Consequently, learning from outcomes is more difficult than it might first 
appear. The early organizational learning literature first raised this issue (Levitt & March, 1988), 
which is well known in the artificial intelligence and agent-based modeling communities as the 
credit attribution problem (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986). It refers to the learners’ 
dilemma of determining what specific prior actions led to specific outcomes and therefore should 
be repeated (Gronhaug & Falkenberg, 1998; Repenning & Sterman, 2002). We noted factors in 
our setting that create substantial attribution challenges -- including a large number of different 
projects, multiple possible causes of good outcomes, and dynamic changes in learning context. 
Our results are consistent with our prediction that factors that increase the perceived relevance of 
a prior project’s outcome for the next project -- such as prior collaboration and project similarity 
-- will enhance the impact of outcomes.  
Our basic perceived relevance arguments envision two key elements: factors that call 
attention to a focal project, and factors that lead the participants or superordinate organizations, 
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once they are aware of a project, to believe it is particularly pertinent to future projects. Our 
quantitative data did not allow us to determine the relative impact of these two elements. We 
have emphasized, however, that our historical data illustrates that at least some participants and 
studios believed valuable knowledge had been developed in prior collaborations -- knowledge 
that could be used again in future projects of a similar type (Flannery, 1990: 156; Schatz, 1998: 
32). Our results are consistent with Kim & Miner’s (2007) framework that emphasized the 
impact of salience and applicability, but our overall findings go beyond that work to underscore 
that power is needed to act upon any gained knowledge, and to hypothesize about short-term 
projects rather than standing firms. Future research should explore the relative roles of simple 
salience effects versus cognitive explanations involving mental models and beliefs about 
relevance.  
Impact of organizational power on learning. We report support for organizational 
power in the form of institutional control over project participants as a key learning contingency. 
Prior project performance only had an impact on repeated collaboration in projects outside the 
original organization, if the focal project occurred in an open organization. This finding advances 
arguments that power can play an important role for the completion of learning cycles. These 
arguments contrast with the widespread emphasis in the learning literature on knowledge and 
information as a source of power (Grant, 1996; Teece, 1986). In our setting the key difference 
between studios did not come from having more or better information. It came from their direct 
ability to control the actions of others, independent of who knew what.  
These findings about the role of control and power have important implications for 
contemporary work on vicarious organizational learning. Theorists have argued that 
organizations learn from actions and outcomes of other organizations (Greve, 2003; Miner & 
Haunschild, 1995) and reported corroborating evidence in the context of acquisition activities 
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(Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000; Haunschild & Miner, 1997) and the adoption of innovations (Greve, 
1998; Kraatz, 1998). In the hybrid-project setting, learning from projects of powerful 
organizations was constrained. The control over project participants enabled an integrated studio 
to block vicarious learning by others about successful combinations of participants from its own 
projects. Thus, repeated vicarious learning in this context does not occur uniformly (Baum, 
Shipilov, & Rowley, 2003; Miner & Anderson, 1999), but rather locally in specific subgroups of 
the project population. Such constrained and local outcome learning represents a topic that merits 
deeper investigation. Important future work should investigate how blocking the replication of 
successful participant combinations shapes outcome learning on the project-system level. 
Scope conditions of performance-outcome learning. Taken as a whole, our 
conditional-only results contrast with findings of unconditional outcome learning in other 
settings, including repeated collaboration among permanent organizations (Li & Rowley, 2002) 
and in acquisition behavior (Haleblian et al., 2006). In internal product development projects, 
however, researchers also found that outcomes sometimes failed to have any impact (Garud & 
Van de Ven, 1992; Van de Ven & Polley, 1992). Proposed causes included ambiguity about 
reliability of performance information (Garud & Van de Ven, 1992) and complete lack of 
attention to some outcomes (Miner et al., 2001). In our setting, however, reliable performance 
information was easily available, yet performance-outcomes were only perceived relevant given 
recent prior collaborations and project-task similarity. Thus, we identify additional potential 
scope conditions for performance-learning in hybrid-project systems. We expect that the 
constraining effect of these scope conditions on performance-outcome learning will be even 
stronger in less transparent industry settings and encourage corresponding empirical 
investigations, for example, in settings such as open-source software systems or 
interorganizational research consortia. 
 36 
Similarly, we introduce organizational power as a second scope condition for vicarious 
performance-outcome learning. In our study, asymmetric organizational control enabled an 
integrated studio to block others from systematically learning from its projects, but this power 
applied specifically to project participants. It seems possible that studios learned other things 
from projects at integrated studios (e.g., what genres audiences preferred (Hsu, 2006)). 
Consequently, we speculate that learning asymmetries may occur in some domains, but not in 
others. This highlights the need for a careful consideration of learning content and learning 
context when predicting learning outcomes. Our work contributes to the general literature on 
asymmetric learning by proposing specific learning barriers related to perceived relevance of 
learning outcomes and organizational power.  
Limitations and Alternative Explanations 
Consistent with traditional learning research, we examine the antecedents and outcomes 
of hypothesized learning processes. In addition, we used historical data to probe the feasibility of 
specific learning processes and influences. Nonetheless, we do not provide quantitative tests of 
specific intermediate learning processes. This highlights the potential value of future more fine-
grained work that directly examines the relative impact of specific intermediate learning 
processes and structural learning factors in hybrid-project systems. 
In addition, we have tested predictions primarily from learning theories, but other 
theoretical traditions offer potentially useful insights as well. Project outcomes, for example, 
could also influence contributor identities (Baker & Faulkner, 1991; Faulkner & Anderson, 1987; 
Zuckerman et al., 2003). Identity considerations could shape participants’ inclination to work 
together again in terms of appropriate behavior (March & Olsen, 1996) rather than project-
outcome improvement. Higher levels of project performance might also provide legitimacy 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) so that colleagues who already wanted to work together, simply 
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because they liked each other, could justify collaborating again. The impact of performance-
outcome learning may also diminish as repeated collaborations increase the legitimacy of 
contributor combinations (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). Such possibilities do not rule out the 
processes we hypothesize, but suggest opportunities for future, more fine-grained theorizing.  
CONCLUSION 
Like other recent work that investigates organizational learning across levels and 
organizational settings (Henderson & Stern, 2004; Miner & Anderson, 1999; Schwab, 2007), we 
find evidence for selective retention of apparently valuable combinations of organizational 
elements within a system over time. Here, this takes the form of replicating more successful 
combinations of project participants. This occurs even though the learning entity, the project 
team, disbands after task completion and cannot serve as organizational memory or the engine of 
future action. The retention of valuable combinations, however, is contingent on several scope 
conditions, including organizational power, and only operates in this context by moderating a 
more general tendency to repeat recent prior activities.  
Many models of system-level change posit that selective retention of behaviors that 
produced better outcomes – regardless of how this happens – can serve as an engine for system-
level adaptation (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003). Are our theories and 
findings consistent with this intuition? On the one hand, our support for performance-outcome 
learning is consistent with learning about more valuable actions, and paying attention to 
outcomes of similar projects may increase the chances that useful knowledge is acted on. On the 
other hand, performance-outcome learning occurred only in the presence of a nonselective short-
term tendency to repeat ties. In addition, organizational power asymmetries led to vicarious 
outcome learning occurring only in subgroups of the population. These contingencies indicate 
narrow and local learning in such systems, which implies slower diffusion of valuable 
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knowledge on the system level. However, such slower adjustments can prevent systems from 
superstitious learning and decisions without sufficient accumulated experience. Simulation 
models, for example, show how slower system-level learning can sometimes actually increase 
adaptive potential in the presence of noisy information about the value of a given action 
(Anderson, 1999; Denrell & March, 2001; Lounamaa & March, 1987; March, 1991). 
Consequently, any long-term adaptive implications will depend on the value of specific patterns 
of change for a given context. 
Taken as a whole, our observations undercut simplistic notions that project systems 
assure system-level adaptation and avoid the well-known challenges in higher-level adaptation 
and learning. At the same time, our study helps illuminate how underlying performance-outcome 
learning can affect both the focus and speed of system-level adjustments. These in turn will 
influence the overall adaptive impact of the emerging repeated collaboration patterns and the 
network evolution process as a whole (Aldrich, 1999; Baum & Singh, 1996; March, 1991; 
Miner, 1990; Miner & Haunschild, 1995). We look forward to future work that directly probes 
the cumulative impact of performance-outcome learning in these systems, and its potential 




Partial Derivative of Interaction Models 
The investigation of conditional effects in models containing interaction terms is based 
on the corresponding partial derivative of the full model that includes the interaction term. The 
following section outlines the derivative equations used to calculate regression coefficient 
estimates for different values of moderator variables (Cohen et al., 2003). 
Prior Collaboration (Table 5). Eq. (1) represents the Model 4 regression equation. Eq. 
(2) is the partial derivative of Eq. (1) for marginal changes of Project Performance (PERF) on 
Future Collaborations (FCt=1 to 4). 
(1)  FCt=1 to 4 = b0 + b1 (PERF) + b2 (PCt=-4 to 0) + b3 (PERF) (PCt=-4 to 0)  + CONTROLS + ε 
(2)  [∂(FCt=1 to 4)/ ∂(PERF)] = b1 + b3 (PCt=-4 to 0) 
   = .024 + .0042 (PCt=-4 to 0) 
Color Movie (Table 6). Eq. (3) represents the Model 4 regression equation. Eq. (4) is the 
partial derivative of Eq. (3) for marginal changes in Project Performance (PERF) moderated by 
Prior Collaborations (Periods -2 to 0) (PCt=-2 to 0) and Color (CM) dummy variable: 
(3)  FCCt=1 to 4 = b0 + b1 (PERF) + b2 (PCt=-2 to 0) + b3 (PERF) (PCt=-2 to 0)  
     + b4 (CM) + b5 (PERF) (CM) + b6 (PCt=-2 to 0) (CM)  
     + b7 (PERF) (PCt=-2 to 0) (CM) + CONTROLS + ε 
(4)  [∂(FCCt=1 to 4)/ ∂(PERF)] = b1 + b3 (PCt=-2 to 0) + b5 (CM) + b7 (PCt=-2 to 0) (CM) 
    = .014 + .001 (PCt=-2 to 0) + .322 (CM) - .012 (PCt=-2 to 0) (CM) 
Organizational Context (Table 7). Eq. (5) represents the Model 4 regression equation. 
Eq. (6) is the partial derivative of Eq. (5) for marginal changes in Project Performance (PERF) 
moderated by Prior Collaborations (Periods -2 to 0) (PCt=-2 to 0) and Not-Integrated Studio (NIS) 
dummy variable:. 
(5)  FCDSt=1 to 4  = b0 + b1 (PERF) + b2 (PCt=-2 to 0) + b3 (PERF) (PCt=-2 to 0)  
         + b4 (NIS) + b5 (PERF) (NIS) + b6 (PCt=-2 to 0) (NIS)  
         + b7 (PERF) (PCt=-2 to 0) (NIS) + CONTROLS + ε 
(6)  [∂(FCDSt=1 to 4)/ ∂(PERF)] = b1 + b3 (PCt=-2 to 0) + b5 (NIS) + b7 (PCt=-2 to 0) (NIS) 
      = -.007 -.0002 (PCt=-2 to 0) - .046 (NIS) + .044 (PCt=-2 to 0) (NIS) 
 
APPENDIX B 
Additional Analyses of Future Collaboration for Different Studio Types 
The higher output of integrated studios increased the probability of future collaborations 
occurring at the same studio instead of other studios. To account for this effect, we looked one-
by-one at the odds of future collaborations occurring outside for every given studio. We assumed 
that the distribution of movies produced by a specific studio in our sample captures the 
distribution of movies produced by the various studios during the time period. Results show that, 
for all integrated studios, the number of future collaborations governed by a different studio was 
significantly lower than the number expected based on random future project assignments. For 
non-integrated studios, in contrast, the expected number of repeated collaborations in future 
projects governed by a different studio was not significantly different from the actual number 
observed. Results are available from first author. 
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Item # Source Statement
1 Balio (1976: 106) Majors were lending talent among each other, but rarely and only at exorbitant fees were they lending 
talent  to minor studios or independents.
2 Balio (1976: 98-102) Code of Fair Competition for the Motion Picture Industry (signed into law 11/27/33) regulated trade 
practices among producers, distributors, exhibitors.  [...] The code contained provisions barring star 
raiding  [...] --but these provisions were suspended by executive order before the code went into effect 
and later were permanently removed.
3 Schatz (1998: 32) Many of the majors were willing to sign one- and two-picture deals with independent producer-
directors , and they would provide both a base of production operations and a solid distribution-
exhibition setup.  In February 1940, Capra signed a one-picture deal with Warner Bros. for 'Meet John 
Doe' […].
4 Flannery (1990: 156) However, because of its [Ninotchka, MGM 1939] overwhelming success, MGM [integrated studio] 
decided to reteam  Garbo and Melvyn Douglas in another social comedy, the disastrous 'Two-Faced 
Woman,' and assigned George Cukor to direct it.
1 Davis (1993: 56) Monogram [minor studio] operated mainly on a freelance  basis with writers and directors, but did make 
contractual arrangements with producers. […] Producers at Monogram noted what the major studios 
were turning out and tried to copy their successes.  Occasionally they succeeded, producing a tentative A 
that made it into the first-run theaters.
2 Davis (1993: 330) Studio moguls stayed current on each other's pictures, and private screenings  were a favorite form of 
Hollywood amusement.  New movies were circulated around the town's mansions before their release, 
sometimes with devastating results.
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Item # Source Statement
1 Powdermaker (1950: 116) Mr. Rough-and-Ready is a successful producer-director of Westerns and serials, who has his own 
independent unit at a major studio, through which his pictures are released. […] He completely 
controls  and dominates his pictures, which are concerned with the heroic escapes from danger and an 
exciting rescue at the end.
2 Rosten (1941: 286-294) The data which follow are based on elaborate questionnaire materials filled out by sixty-nine directors. 
[…] The directors who earn huge sums per week or per picture often refuse  employment on pictures 
or stories which they do not wish to direct.
3 Schatz (1998: 23) With Capra's [director] increasing success, Cohn [producer] repaid his star director not only with 
salary increases, but also with greater creative and administrative  freedom.   After the enormous 
success of 'It Happened One Night' in 1934, Cohn offered Capra producer-director status and a six-
picture deal, at $100,000 per picture plus 24 percent of the net profits.
4 Capra (1971: 105) As Capra said of the long-term contracts  signed with Columbia in the 1930s, "I was trading away 
money for power I couldn't get at any other studio."
5 Powdermaker (1950: 198) With them [producers], too, he [Mr. Prestige, director] discusses and argues, and usually but not 
always manages to get his way  because of his capacity of holding out.
1 Rosten (1941: 331) Many stars in Hollywood do have "story approval" clauses in their contracts, and can refuse  to appear 
in roles which seem unsympathetic or unflattering.
2 Powdermaker (1950: 212) Another star managed a bit better because he had a flexible contract  which allowed him to make 
pictures for two studios.
3 Davis (1993: 106) By the 1930s powerful agents had appeared in Hollywood--Myron Selznick, Minna Wallis, Leland 
Hayward--who negotiated advantageous clauses  for their top clients, sometimes splitting their 
contracts between studios, securing directorial and casting approval for them, making sure they had 
dressing rooms and accommodations commensurate with their salaries.
4 Schatz (1998: 220) Through her agent, she [Bette Davis] sent the following list of demands  to the studio: a five-year 
contract at a salary that escalated from $100,000 to $220,000 per year; the right to make no more than 
four pictures a year; star or co-star billing; the services of her favorite cameramen; and three months' 
consecutive vacation each year with the right to do one outside picture.
5 Pickard (1978: 338) Robert Montgomery, a well-known romantic lead at the studio in the thirties, was another who gave as 
good as he got.  Bored with being forever cast as a smooth, debonair leading man he would 
periodically go to Mayer demanding  meatier dramatic parts.  After loud and bitter arguments that 
rebounded off the walls of Mayer's plush office, he usually got them. 
6 Powdermaker (1950: 213).  Another time, when the producer was not sympathetic and an actor thought a role, that of a foreigner, 
was not good for him, he asked the make-up man to report that he could not possibly be made up to 
look the part.  Sometimes an appeal  is made to the casting director not to be recommended for a 
contemplated role.  Or the actor may resort to telling the producer how "unhappy" he will be playing 
this role, the theory being that an unhappy actor does not do a good job.
Note: Italics identify the search terms used to find the respective exemplar.
B. Actor
TABLE 2
Illustrative Examples of Project Participant's Control Over Future Project Assignments





1 Future Collaborations (Periods 1 to 4) Number of repeated dyadic relationships between key project contributors during the four years after 
project completion.
Imdb
2 Future Color Movie Collaborations (Periods 
1 to 4) 
Number of repeated dyadic relationships between key project contributors in future color movie projects 
during the four years after project completion.
AFI
3 Future Collaborations Governed By 
Different Studio (Periods 1 to 4) 
Number of repeated dyadic relationships between key project contributors in future movie projects 
governed by a different studio during the four years after project completion.
AFI
B. Independent Variables
4 Project Performance Movie box-office rating by theater operators. Boxoffice, Boxoffice 
Barometer, Motion Picture 
Herald
5 Prior Collaborations (Periods -4 to 0) Number of prior dyadic relationships between key project contributors during the same and four 
preceding years.
Imdb
6 Prior Collaborations (Period -2 to 0) Number of prior dyadic relationships between key project contributors during the same and two 
preceding years.
Imdb
7 Prior Collaborations (Periods -5 to -3) Number of prior dyadic relationships between key project contributors during three to five years Imdb
8 Color Movie Movie project employing color technology. AFI




10 Production Time (#Days) Number of days between the beginning and the end of filming scenes. AFI, Hollywood Reporter
11 Cast Size Number of cast members. AFI
12 Above-the-Line Cast Credits Number cast members whose name were used to promote the movie in printed advertisements. AFI
13 Director Prior Nominations Director's number of prior nominations for a directing award of the AMP. Imdb
14 Actor1 Prior Nominations First lead actor's number of prior nominations for an acting award of the AMP. Imdb
17 Actor2 Prior Nominations Second lead actor's number of prior nominations for an acting award of the AMP. Imdb
18 Producer Prior Nominations Producer's number of prior nominations for a producer award of the AMP. Imdb
19 Camera Prior Nominations Camera person's number of prior nominations for a cinematography award of the AMP. Imdb
20 Art Director Prior Nominations Art director's number of prior nominations for an art direction award of the AMP. Imdb
21 Editor Prior Nominations Editor's number of prior nominations for an editing award of the AMP. Imdb
22 Director Prior Films Director's number of prior movie projects as director. Imdb
23 Actor1 Prior Films Lead actor's number of prior movie projects as actor. Imdb
24 Producer Prior Films Producer's number of prior movie projects as producer. Imdb
25 Camera Prior Films Camera person's number of prior movie projects as cinematographer. Imdb
26 Art Director Prior Films Art director's number of prior movie projects as art director. Imdb
27 Editor Prior Films Editor's number of prior movie projects as editor. Imdb
28 No Editor (Dummy) Movie project with unknown editor. AFI, Imdb
29 No Art Director (Dummy) Movie project with unknown art director. AFI, Imdb
30 Release Quarter (Dummy) Quarter of the year the movie was released in. AFI
31 Genre (Dummy) Movie project classified as either a drama, comedy, or musical. AFI
32 Serial (Dummy) Movie continues characters and story developed in a prior movie. AFI
33 Revbox (Dummy) Boxoffice Barometer (1937-1951) as source of box-office ratings by theater operators. Boxoffice Barometer
34 Boweekly (Dummy) Boxoffice (1932-1935) as source of box-office ratings by theater operators. Boxoffice
35 Director Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) Director's number of future movie projects as director during the following four years. Imdb
36 Actor1 Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) First lead actor's number of future movie projects as actor during the following four years. Imdb
37 Actor2 Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) Second lead actor's number of future movie projects as actor during the following four years. Imdb
38 Art Director Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) Art director's number of future movie projects as art director during the following four years. Imdb
39 Producer Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) Producer's number of future movie projects as producer during the following four years. Imdb
40 Editor Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) Editor's number of future movie projects as editor during the following four years. Imdb
41 Camera Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) Camera person's number of future movie projects as cinematographer during the following four years. Imdb





Mean S D Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1 Future Collaborations (Periods 1 to 4) 15.01 11.95 0 63 1.00
2 Future Color Movie Collaborations (Periods 1 to 4) 1.19 2.92 0 17 0.55 1.00
3 Future Collaborations Governed By Different Studio 1.01 2.77 0 24 -0.05 0.10 1.00
4 Project Performance 104.57 18.66 45 180 0.16 0.37 0.07 1.00
5 Prior Collaborations (Periods -4 to 0) 16.73 14.76 0 87 0.40 0.36 0.08 0.03 1.00
6 Prior Collaborations (Period -2 to 0) 13.18 11.69 0 75 0.41 0.33 0.05 -0.01 0.95 1.00
7 Prior Collaborations (Periods -5 to -3) 4.51 6.41 0 33 0.22 0.31 0.15 0.11 0.72 0.47 1.00
8 Color Movie 0.03 0.16 0 1 0.20 0.31 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.16 1.00
9 Non-Integrated Studio 0.08 0.27 0 1 -0.19 -0.01 0.65 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.15 1.00
10 Project Performance x Prior Collaborations (P -4 to 0) 1756.1 1606.8 0 10080 0.46 0.49 0.07 0.26 0.94 0.88 0.73 0.18 -0.02 1.00
11 Project Performance x Recent Prior Collab. (P -2 to 0) 1376.1 1236.5 0 7420 0.48 0.46 0.04 0.23 0.91 0.94 0.50 0.15 -0.03 0.95 1.00
12 Project Performance x Prior Collaborations (P -5 to -3) 484.71 713.65 0 3900 0.26 0.41 0.13 0.24 0.69 0.46 0.97 0.21 0.02 0.77 0.55 1.00
13 Project Performance x Color Movie 2.93 18.63 0 150 0.23 0.35 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.19 0.98 0.14 0.22 0.18 0.26 1.00
14 Project Performance x Non-Integrated Studio 8.56 29.80 0 180 -0.18 0.01 0.67 0.11 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.15 0.98 -0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.14 1.00
15 Prior Collaborations (P -2 to 0) x Color Movie 0.49 4.25 0 50 0.31 0.31 0.01 0.14 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.73 -0.01 0.35 0.31 0.34 0.78 -0.01 1.00
16 Prior Collaborations (P -2 to 0) x Non-Integrated Studio 0.97 4.74 0 48 -0.09 -0.06 0.64 -0.04 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.00 0.70 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.64 -0.02 1.00
17 Project Perf. x Prior Collab. (P -2 to 0) x Color Movie 62.69 538.56 0 5750 0.31 0.31 0.01 0.15 0.28 0.23 0.28 0.73 -0.01 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.79 -0.01 0.99 -0.02 1.00
18 Project Perf. x Prior Collab. (P -2 to 0) x Non-Int. Studio 98.66 472.17 0 4800 -0.09 -0.05 0.66 -0.02 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.01 0.71 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.01 0.66 -0.02 1.00 -0.02 1.00
19 Production Time (#Days) 45.96 22.57 21 212 0.07 0.19 0.06 0.33 0.13 0.06 0.26 0.07 0.02 0.17 0.12 0.26 0.08 0.05 0.03 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 1.00
20 Cast Size 35.03 22.33 10 130 0.06 0.22 0.03 0.25 0.07 0.02 0.20 0.05 0.01 0.17 0.11 0.25 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.18 1.00
21 Above-the-Line Cast Credits 0.98 0.94 0 3 0.11 0.08 -0.07 0.21 0.03 0.03 0.07 -0.05 -0.04 0.08 0.07 0.10 -0.04 -0.05 0.06 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.10 0.09 1.00
22 Director Prior Nominations 0.26 0.74 0 5 0.14 0.25 -0.04 0.30 0.14 0.08 0.23 0.05 -0.06 0.23 0.18 0.29 0.08 -0.06 0.09 -0.06 0.10 -0.06 0.14 0.08 0.13
23 Actor1 Prior Nominations 0.11 0.43 0 4 0.05 0.17 0.08 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.40 0.07 0.23 0.20 0.22 0.46 0.07 0.31 0.02 0.37 0.02 0.16 0.12 0.03
24 Actor2 Prior Nominations 0.30 0.68 0 3 -0.07 0.06 0.18 0.22 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 0.17 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.18 0.07 0.11 -0.05 0.11 -0.04 0.10 0.07 0.14
25 Actor3 Prior Nominations 0.06 0.25 0 2 0.09 0.21 0.04 0.21 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.17 -0.01 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.21 0.01 0.12 -0.03 0.15 -0.03 0.06 0.07 0.15
26 Producer Prior Nominations 0.76 1.25 0 6 0.21 0.33 -0.04 0.09 0.21 0.13 0.32 0.18 -0.13 0.25 0.18 0.34 0.20 -0.11 0.27 -0.11 0.27 -0.11 0.13 0.09 0.04
27 Camera Prior Nominations 0.41 0.88 0 4 0.02 0.10 -0.06 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.08 -0.12 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.07 -0.12 -0.05 -0.09 -0.05 -0.09 0.13 0.06 0.02
28 Art Director Prior Nominations 1.93 2.46 0 8 0.09 0.20 -0.20 0.23 0.06 0.00 0.18 0.04 -0.20 0.13 0.08 0.21 0.06 -0.19 0.11 -0.15 0.12 -0.15 0.18 0.22 0.16
29 Editor Prior Nominations 0.08 0.30 0 2 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.04 -0.03 0.16 -0.04 -0.08 0.07 0.00 0.17 -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0.11 0.00 0.04
30 Director Prior Films 34.10 26.71 0 140 0.10 0.27 0.04 0.09 0.25 0.18 0.35 0.09 0.06 0.26 0.20 0.35 0.11 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.21 0.18 0.03
31 Actor1 Prior Films 25.92 27.86 0 188 -0.01 0.01 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.23 -0.03 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.19 -0.03 0.13 -0.05 0.14 -0.05 0.14 0.25 0.18 0.09
32 Actor2 Prior Films 30.72 30.47 0 204 -0.12 -0.08 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.05 0.15 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.11 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.11 0.03
33 Producer Prior Films 24.76 34.76 0 373 0.15 0.17 0.43 0.02 0.38 0.33 0.38 0.10 0.15 0.35 0.30 0.36 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.47 0.09 0.48 0.03 0.12 -0.04
34 Camera Prior Films 57.16 28.37 0 125 0.12 0.15 -0.09 0.05 0.26 0.20 0.28 0.02 -0.05 0.29 0.24 0.30 0.03 -0.06 0.15 0.00 0.15 -0.01 -0.10 0.13 0.16
35 Art Director Prior Films 96.31 133.33 0 487 0.12 0.15 -0.18 0.19 0.11 0.03 0.24 0.00 -0.18 0.16 0.09 0.27 0.02 -0.17 0.06 -0.12 0.08 -0.13 0.18 0.14 0.33
36 Editor Prior Films 19.79 13.72 0 82 0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.13 -0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.12 -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.09
37 No Editor (Dummy) 0.02 0.13 0 1 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.13 -0.05 -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.09 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.04 -0.07
38 No Art Director (Dummy) 0.03 0.16 0 1 -0.07 -0.07 0.19 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.05 -0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.24 -0.02 0.24 0.00 0.02 -0.05
39 Release Quarter 1 (Dummy) 0.22 0.42 0 1 0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.05 -0.14 -0.09 -0.01 -0.09 -0.06 -0.13 -0.08 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01
40 Release Quarter 2 (Dummy) 0.22 0.42 0 1 -0.16 -0.06 0.07 -0.17 0.00 -0.03 0.09 0.04 0.14 -0.04 -0.06 0.03 0.04 0.15 -0.05 0.10 -0.05 0.10 0.04 -0.04 -0.06
41 Release Quarter 3 (Dummy) 0.22 0.42 0 1 0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 -0.09 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.08 -0.08 0.06 -0.06 0.09 -0.06 0.09 0.04 -0.01 0.11
42 Comedy Genre (Dummy) 0.25 0.43 0 1 -0.05 -0.12 0.04 0.01 -0.11 -0.11 -0.07 -0.09 -0.06 -0.11 -0.11 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 0.02 -0.07 0.01 -0.05 0.05 0.16
43 Musical Genre (Dummy) 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.04 0.09 -0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.22 -0.01 0.02
44 Color (Dummy) 0.03 0.16 0 1 0.20 0.31 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.16 1.00 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.21 0.98 0.15 0.73 0.00 0.73 0.01 0.07 0.05 -0.05
45 Serial (Dummy) 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.02 -0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.12 -0.03 -0.02
46 Revbox (Dummy) 0.07 0.25 0 1 0.00 -0.08 -0.01 -0.20 -0.03 0.00 -0.08 -0.04 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.09 -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -0.17 -0.17
47 Boweekly (Dummy) 0.39 0.49 0 1 -0.01 -0.19 -0.12 -0.07 -0.12 -0.07 -0.19 -0.13 -0.17 -0.16 -0.11 -0.21 -0.13 -0.15 -0.09 -0.14 -0.09 -0.13 0.00 -0.10 -0.03
48 Director Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) 8.60 4.80 0 22 0.16 0.07 0.05 -0.12 0.15 0.17 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.13 -0.14 -0.14
49 Actor1 Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) 9.74 5.73 0 27 0.06 -0.10 -0.10 -0.25 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.03 -0.11 -0.16 -0.15 -0.14 -0.05 -0.12 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.21 -0.13 -0.37
50 Actor2 Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) 12.10 6.63 0 40 0.13 -0.13 0.09 -0.08 0.03 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.12 -0.05 0.12 -0.18 -0.13 -0.25
51 Art Director Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) 73.94 66.33 0 191 0.18 0.05 -0.28 0.13 0.01 -0.02 0.07 -0.03 -0.30 0.07 0.04 0.10 -0.01 -0.29 0.02 -0.21 0.04 -0.22 0.13 0.09 0.28
52 Producer Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) 20.78 24.36 0 147 0.46 0.13 -0.07 -0.19 0.21 0.26 0.01 0.06 -0.15 0.17 0.22 0.00 0.05 -0.15 0.10 -0.06 0.09 -0.06 -0.12 -0.10 -0.13
53 Editor Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) 10.92 5.44 0 37 0.07 -0.09 -0.08 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 -0.07 -0.10 -0.11 -0.03 0.00 -0.08 -0.10 -0.12 -0.06 0.08 -0.07 0.07 -0.05 0.01 0.04
54 Camera Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) 17.05 7.87 0 58 -0.08 -0.14 0.07 -0.15 0.05 0.06 0.00 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 0.17 -0.06 0.17 -0.13 -0.07 -0.03
Note: All correlations with absolute values above .12 are statistically significant at p<.05
TABLE 4




22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38
22 Director Prior Nominations 1.00
23 Actor1 Prior Nominations 0.22 1.00
24 Actor2 Prior Nominations 0.12 0.13 1.00
25 Actor3 Prior Nominations -0.04 0.17 0.12 1.00
26 Producer Prior Nominations 0.13 0.01 0.07 0.02 1.00
27 Camera Prior Nominations 0.14 -0.04 0.03 0.04 0.11 1.00
28 Art Director Prior Nominations 0.42 0.09 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.22 1.00
29 Editor Prior Nominations 0.25 0.00 0.01 -0.06 0.14 0.07 0.13 1.00
30 Director Prior Films 0.18 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.11 0.23 0.08 1.00
31 Actor1 Prior Films 0.01 0.18 0.11 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.14 1.00
32 Actor2 Prior Films 0.14 0.08 0.15 0.01 0.05 -0.05 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.35 1.00
33 Producer Prior Films 0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.13 -0.03 1.00
34 Camera Prior Films 0.15 -0.04 -0.09 -0.01 0.16 0.18 0.03 -0.02 0.15 -0.12 -0.02 0.03 1.00
35 Art Director Prior Films 0.40 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.00 0.13 0.65 0.12 0.24 0.01 0.12 -0.11 0.09 1.00
36 Editor Prior Films 0.10 -0.03 -0.08 -0.03 -0.06 0.03 0.10 0.21 0.01 0.02 0.07 -0.06 0.10 0.10 1.00
37 No Editor (Dummy) -0.05 0.12 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.18 1.00
38 No Art Director (Dummy) -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.13 0.05 -0.10 0.07 0.05 0.37 -0.01 -0.12 -0.02 -0.02 1.00
39 Release Quarter 1 (Dummy) -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.10 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.10 -0.09 0.03 -0.07 -0.09
40 Release Quarter 2 (Dummy) -0.14 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.01 -0.07 -0.07 0.03 0.02 0.15 0.15 -0.03 -0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.04
41 Release Quarter 3 (Dummy) 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.11 0.00 0.12 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02
42 Comedy Genre (Dummy) 0.05 -0.10 0.04 -0.06 -0.09 -0.07 0.06 0.11 -0.14 0.13 0.09 0.08 -0.08 -0.01 0.03 0.08 0.09
43 Musical Genre (Dummy) 0.00 0.07 -0.13 0.05 0.00 0.16 0.13 -0.06 0.09 -0.03 -0.15 -0.02 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.02 -0.01
44 Color (Dummy) 0.05 0.40 0.17 0.17 0.18 -0.08 0.04 -0.04 0.09 -0.03 -0.03 0.10 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
45 Serial (Dummy) -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 -0.05 -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 0.02 -0.03 0.07 0.09 -0.02 0.03 -0.10 0.08 -0.03 -0.03
46 Revbox (Dummy) 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 -0.05 -0.10 -0.07 -0.06 0.00 0.09 -0.01 -0.15 0.00 -0.09 0.10 -0.04
47 Boweekly (Dummy) -0.17 -0.04 0.00 -0.05 -0.17 -0.10 -0.26 -0.21 -0.12 -0.09 -0.01 -0.14 -0.17 -0.16 -0.13 0.03 0.04
48 Director Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) -0.14 -0.03 -0.21 0.02 -0.11 0.03 -0.12 -0.04 0.24 -0.10 -0.21 0.03 0.08 -0.11 0.01 0.09 -0.04
49 Actor1 Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) -0.14 -0.11 -0.25 -0.08 -0.04 0.05 -0.18 -0.15 -0.08 -0.12 0.13 -0.04 -0.08 -0.14 -0.04 -0.01 0.12
50 Actor2 Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) -0.09 -0.05 -0.10 -0.11 -0.07 -0.05 -0.18 -0.11 -0.17 0.13 -0.06 0.13 -0.11 -0.26 -0.05 0.05 0.13
51 Art Director Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) 0.25 0.12 0.00 0.14 -0.03 0.10 0.67 0.07 0.14 -0.04 -0.01 -0.11 0.07 0.68 0.04 -0.02 -0.18
52 Producer Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) -0.07 -0.08 -0.12 -0.09 0.24 -0.11 -0.24 -0.06 -0.08 -0.09 -0.01 0.12 0.03 -0.26 -0.04 0.12 -0.05
53 Editor Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) -0.03 -0.19 0.01 -0.10 -0.14 -0.03 -0.12 0.07 -0.03 -0.07 0.08 -0.09 0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.26 0.06
54 Camera Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) -0.13 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.01 -0.08 -0.17 0.03 -0.12 -0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.09 -0.13 -0.02 -0.03 0.20
39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53
39 Release Quarter 1 (Dummy) 1.00
40 Release Quarter 2 (Dummy) -0.28 1.00
41 Release Quarter 3 (Dummy) -0.28 -0.28 1.00
42 Comedy Genre (Dummy) 0.00 -0.03 -0.07 1.00
43 Musical Genre (Dummy) 0.03 -0.09 -0.02 -0.29 1.00
44 Color (Dummy) -0.09 0.04 -0.09 -0.09 0.05 1.00
45 Serial (Dummy) 0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.10 -0.03 1.00
46 Revbox (Dummy) -0.06 0.10 -0.10 0.08 -0.09 -0.04 0.04 1.00
47 Boweekly (Dummy) 0.17 -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 0.00 -0.13 -0.11 -0.22 1.00
48 Director Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.03 0.05 0.05 0.11 -0.04 0.04 1.00
49 Actor1 Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) 0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 -0.18 -0.03 0.07 0.14 0.16 0.16 1.00
50 Actor2 Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) -0.04 0.04 -0.05 0.03 -0.13 -0.01 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.20 1.00
51 Art Director Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) 0.00 -0.07 0.06 0.01 0.17 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.13 -0.19 -0.19 1.00
52 Producer Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.13 0.06 0.04 0.10 -0.02 0.17 0.23 0.18 -0.29 1.00
53 Editor Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) 0.05 0.07 -0.08 0.09 0.03 -0.10 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.07 1
54 Camera Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) -0.03 0.02 -0.08 0.03 0.06 -0.08 -0.06 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.14 -0.17 0.00 0.2481
Note: All correlations with absolute values above .12 are statistically significant at p<.05
n = 239
TABLE 4 (cont)





Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Constant -18.20 ** (5.90) -16.33 ** (5.72) -26.91 *** (6.71) -19.14 ** (6.77) -26.90 *** (6.69) -19.44 ** (6.73) -27.12 *** (6.72) -18.38 ** (6.62) -27.15 *** (6.92) -25.17 *** (7.43)
Production Time (#Days) 0.04  (0.03) 0.02  (0.03) 0.00  (0.03) 0.01  (0.03) 0.00  (0.03) 0.00 * (0.03) 0.01  (0.03) 0.01  (0.03) 0.01  (0.03) 0.02  (0.04)
Cast Size 0.04  (0.03) 0.03  (0.03) 0.02  (0.03) 0.01  (0.03) 0.02  (0.03) 0.02  (0.03) 0.03  (0.03) 0.01  (0.03) 0.02  (0.03) 0.01  (0.04)
Above-the-Line Cast Credits 1.53 † (0.80) 1.79 * (0.80) 1.63 * (0.79) 1.46 † (0.78) 1.58 * (0.79) 1.49 † (0.78) 1.51 † (0.77) 1.36 † (0.76) 1.54 † (0.81) 1.47 † (0.82)
Director Prior Nominations 1.96 † (1.11) 1.76 † (0.99) 1.17  (0.96) 0.95  (0.96) 1.14  (0.97) 1.17  (0.97) 1.21  (0.94) 1.05  (0.92) 1.24  (1.07) 1.11  (1.07)
Actor1 Prior Nominations -1.24  (1.68) -2.12  (1.50) -2.28  (1.42) -2.82 * (1.35) -2.28  (1.45) -2.53 † (1.51) -2.27  (1.47) -2.81 * (1.42) -1.52  (1.56) -1.78  (1.59)
Actor2 Prior Nominations 0.15  (0.94) 0.19  (0.91) -0.17  (0.92) 0.05  (0.93) -0.23  (0.95) -0.04  (0.95) -0.33  (0.92) -0.09  (0.93) 0.01  (0.98) 0.05  (1.00)
Actor3 Prior Nominations 4.08 † (2.15) 2.47  (2.23) 1.40  (2.31) 1.02  (2.40) 1.38  (2.30) 0.80  (2.42) 1.54  (2.24) 1.01  (2.35) 2.55  (2.31) 2.52  (2.32)
Producer Prior Nominations 0.18  (0.72) 0.00  (0.67) -0.12  (0.67) -0.20  (0.66) -0.04  (0.69) -0.06  (0.68) 0.08  (0.67) 0.00  (0.65) -0.18  (0.71) -0.21  (0.71)
Camera Prior Nominations 0.23  (0.74) 0.22  (0.67) 0.21  (0.68) 0.42  (0.68) 0.14  (0.69) 0.37  (0.69) 0.03  (0.69) 0.28  (0.70) 0.43  (0.72) 0.46  (0.72)
Art Director Prior Nominations -0.18  (0.74) -0.50  (0.73) -0.68  (0.75) -0.58  (0.74) -0.67  (0.76) -0.57  (0.74) -0.66  (0.76) -0.54  (0.75) -0.41  (0.76) -0.39  (0.76)
Editor Prior Nominations -0.04  (2.00) 0.10  (2.01) 0.03  (1.99) -0.41  (2.04) 0.26  (1.93) 0.09  (1.93) 0.43  (1.92) 0.06  (1.93) -0.40  (2.05) -0.53  (2.07)
Director Prior Films 0.02  (0.02) 0.00  (0.02) 0.01  (0.02) 0.00  (0.02) 0.01  (0.02) 0.01  (0.02) 0.01  (0.02) 0.01  (0.02) 0.01  (0.02) 0.01  (0.02)
Actor1 Prior Films 0.01  (0.03) 0.01  (0.03) 0.01  (0.03) 0.02  (0.03) 0.01  (0.03) 0.01  (0.03) 0.01  (0.03) 0.02  (0.03) 0.00  (0.03) 0.01  (0.03)
Actor2 Prior Films -0.04 † (0.02) -0.04 † (0.02) -0.03  (0.02) -0.03  (0.02) -0.03  (0.02) -0.03  (0.02) -0.03  (0.02) -0.03  (0.02) -0.03 † (0.02) -0.03  (0.02)
Producer Prior Films 0.02  (0.02) -0.01  (0.02) -0.01  (0.02) 0.00  (0.02) -0.01  (0.02) 0.00  (0.02) 0.00  (0.02) 0.01  (0.02) 0.01  (0.02) 0.01  (0.02)
Camera Prior Films 0.00  (0.02) -0.02  (0.02) -0.02  (0.02) -0.02  (0.02) -0.02  (0.02) -0.02  (0.02) -0.01  (0.02) -0.02  (0.02) -0.01  (0.02) -0.01  (0.02)
Art Director Prior Films 0.01  (0.01) 0.00  (0.01) 0.01  (0.01) 0.01  (0.01) 0.01  (0.01) 0.01  (0.01) 0.01  (0.01) 0.01  (0.01) 0.01  (0.01) 0.01  (0.01)
Editor Prior Films 0.09 † (0.05) 0.06  (0.05) 0.08  (0.05) 0.08  (0.05) 0.08 † (0.05) 0.09 † (0.05) 0.09 † (0.05) 0.09 † (0.05) 0.09 † (0.05) 0.09 † (0.05)
No Editor (Dummy) -1.24  (3.93) 0.20  (4.08) 1.23  (4.22) -0.16  (3.81) 1.43  (4.24) 0.18  (3.78) 1.47  (4.23) -0.04  (3.78) -0.12  (3.84) -0.46  (3.77)
No Art Director (Dummy) 1.42  (5.38) 3.76  (5.51) 3.20  (5.18) 1.66  (5.06) 3.09  (5.19) 1.91  (4.96) 3.08  (5.14) 1.48  (4.96) 1.26  (5.16) 0.81  (5.23)
Release Quarter 1 (Dummy) 1.52  (2.01) 1.28  (1.92) 1.59  (1.90) 1.24  (1.85) 1.53  (1.91) 1.27  (1.83) 1.49  (1.90) 1.10  (1.82) 1.84  (2.00) 1.70  (2.00)
Release Quarter 2 (Dummy) -1.12  (1.66) -1.78  (1.61) -0.99  (1.59) -1.18  (1.58) -1.04  (1.61) -1.51  (1.58) -0.91  (1.61) -1.25  (1.58) -0.77  (1.65) -0.72  (1.65)
Release Quarter 3 (Dummy) 0.03  (1.92) -0.15  (1.82) 0.19  (1.74) -0.30  (1.76) 0.13  (1.74) -0.41  (1.76) 0.18  (1.74) -0.41  (1.76) 0.20  (1.83) 0.10  (1.83)
Comedy Genre (Dummy) 0.01  (1.69) 0.47  (1.68) 0.36  (1.68) 0.69  (1.69) 0.38  (1.69) 0.56  (1.68) 0.34  (1.68) 0.67  (1.68) 0.06  (1.72) 0.19  (1.72)
Musical Genre (Dummy) 1.35  (2.00) 1.36  (1.90) 1.17  (1.82) 1.46  (1.78) 1.11  (1.82) 1.22  (1.79) 1.01  (1.85) 1.28  (1.80) 1.36  (1.89) 1.47  (1.89)
Color (Dummy) 13.39 † (7.42) 14.32 * (5.56) 14.81 ** (5.13) 13.35 ** (5.08) 14.78 ** (5.22) 14.69 ** (5.21) 14.95 ** (5.34) 13.80 ** (5.23) 13.62 * (6.46) 12.86 † (6.64)
Serial (Dummy) 1.85  (2.64) 0.33  (2.65) -0.90  (2.78) -0.65  (2.98) -0.75  (2.76) 0.21  (2.75) -0.57  (2.72) 0.02  (2.86) 0.16  (2.85) 0.04  (2.94)
Revbox (Dummy) -10.31 † (6.04) -6.47  (5.82) -5.82  (5.83) -5.83  (5.89) -5.57  (5.86) -5.07  (5.90) -5.38  (5.78) -5.24  (5.85) -9.49  (6.12) -9.59  (6.12)
Boweekly (Dummy) -10.99 † (6.30) -6.92  (6.17) -7.38  (6.23) -5.55  (6.29) -7.03  (6.29) -4.67  (6.32) -6.69  (6.20) -4.47  (6.22) -11.42 † (6.44) -11.06 † (6.45)
Time Dummies (8) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
20th Century Fox 14.42 ** (4.51) 14.97 *** (4.33) 15.33 *** (4.31) 14.92 *** (4.34) 15.02 *** (4.31) 15.33 *** (4.47) 14.52 *** (4.34) 14.32 *** (4.38) 15.77 *** (4.39) 15.32 *** (4.49)
20th Century 1.87  (5.52) 4.29  (5.09) 5.43  (4.79) 4.37  (4.99) 5.48  (4.73) 4.30  (5.11) 5.22  (4.79) 4.00  (5.07) 3.80  (5.00) 3.58  (5.06)
Columbia 0.82  (4.01) 2.95  (3.84) 4.14  (3.77) 4.12  (3.73) 4.03  (3.72) 4.36  (3.72) 3.71  (3.74) 3.82  (3.70) 2.85  (3.87) 2.69  (3.89)
1st National 3.99  (6.15) 8.41  (5.81) 8.78  (5.70) 6.61  (5.74) 9.08  (5.79) 7.35  (6.13) 9.14  (5.94) 6.88  (6.11) 4.91  (5.70) 4.34  (5.68)
Fox 0.05  (4.54) 3.30  (4.31) 4.69  (4.32) 4.45  (4.29) 4.60  (4.28) 4.54  (4.33) 4.38  (4.34) 4.17  (4.33) 2.21  (4.41) 2.08  (4.42)
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2.34  (4.57) 4.80  (4.37) 5.07  (4.45) 4.77  (4.43) 5.24  (4.45) 4.81  (4.56) 5.30  (4.54) 4.88  (4.54) 2.85  (4.45) 2.85  (4.45)
Paramount 1.03  (4.85) 4.48  (4.81) 6.02  (4.81) 5.70  (4.80) 5.96  (4.77) 6.05  (4.77) 5.51  (4.83) 5.33  (4.81) 3.82  (4.79) 3.57  (4.82)
RKO 4.15  (4.04) 1.54  (4.09) 2.17  (3.98) 2.79  (3.93) 2.24  (3.88) 3.14  (3.91) 2.06  (3.94) 2.83  (3.91) 4.71  (3.88) 4.66  (3.88)
United Artists 6.23  (4.15) 8.61 * (4.16) 8.68 * (3.94) 9.20 * (4.01) 8.73 * (3.94) 9.84 * (4.10) 8.28 * (3.99) 9.12 * (4.10) 7.54 † (3.84) 7.42 † (3.87)
Universal 7.32  (4.75) 7.86 † (4.45) 8.34 † (4.41) 9.28 * (4.38) 8.30 † (4.35) 10.07 * (4.39) 7.89 † (4.38) 9.29 * (4.38) 8.65 † (4.62) 8.54 † (4.59)
Warner Brothers -2.47  (4.63) 0.57  (4.42) 0.82  (4.42) 0.11  (4.42) 1.00  (4.41) 0.77  (4.48) 1.08  (4.47) 0.44  (4.47) -1.91  (4.49) -2.18  (4.52)
Warner Brothers/First National 6.28  (4.94) 7.87  (4.79) 7.57  (4.78) 6.59  (4.86) 7.77  (4.78) 7.36  (4.92) 8.03 † (4.84) 7.09  (4.89) 5.76  (4.76) 5.39  (4.84)
Director Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) 0.27  (0.17) 0.18  (0.16) 0.19  (0.16) 0.22  (0.16) 0.18  (0.16) 0.24  (0.16) 0.17  (0.16) 0.22  (0.16) 0.27 † (0.16) 0.27 † (0.16)
Actor1 Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) 0.22  (0.14) 0.26 * (0.13) 0.27 * (0.12) 0.23 † (0.12) 0.27 * (0.12) 0.23 † (0.12) 0.27 * (0.12) 0.23 † (0.12) 0.24 † (0.13) 0.23 † (0.13)
Actor2 Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) 0.28 ** (0.10) 0.24 * (0.10) 0.22 * (0.09) 0.18 * (0.09) 0.22 * (0.09) 0.17 † (0.10) 0.23 * (0.09) 0.18 † (0.09) 0.24 ** (0.09) 0.24 * (0.09)
Producer Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) 0.22 *** (0.05) 0.19 *** (0.05) 0.20 *** (0.05) 0.21 *** (0.05) 0.20 *** (0.05) 0.20 *** (0.05) 0.19 *** (0.05) 0.20 *** (0.05) 0.24 *** (0.05) 0.24 *** (0.05)
Camera Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) 0.00  (0.10) -0.02  (0.09) -0.02  (0.09) 0.02  (0.09) -0.02 (0.09) 0.03 (0.09) -0.02 (0.09) 0.02 (0.09) 0.00 (0.09) 0.00 (0.09)
Art Director Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) 0.05 ** (0.02) 0.06 *** (0.02) 0.07 *** (0.02) 0.06 *** (0.02) 0.07 *** (0.02) 0.06 *** (0.02) 0.07 *** (0.02) 0.06 *** (0.02) 0.05 ** (0.02) 0.05 ** (0.02)
Editor Future Films (Periods 1 to 4) 0.10  (0.14) 0.10 (0.13) 0.10  (0.13) 0.09  (0.13) 0.10  (0.13) 0.08  (0.13) 0.10  (0.13) 0.08  (0.13) 0.12  (0.14) 0.12  (0.14)
Prior Collaboration (Periods -4 to 0) 0.243 *** (0.070) 0.252 *** (0.065) -0.182  (0.139)
Project Performance 0.102 * (0.041) 0.024  (0.043) 0.101 * (0.041) 0.020  (0.045) 0.099 * (0.041) 0.009  (0.043) 0.097 * (0.042) 0.079  (0.048)
Project Performance x 0.0042 ** (0.001)
Prior Collaborations (Periods -4 to 0) 
Prior Collaborations (Periods -2 to 0) 0.268 *** (0.080) -0.463 * (0.215) 0.292 *** (0.079) -0.312 † (0.163)
Prior Collaborations (Periods -5 to -3) 0.140  (0.129) 0.783  (0.564) 0.303 * (0.145) -0.118  (0.549)
Project Performance x 0.007 *** (0.002) 0.0059 *** (0.002)
Prior Collaborations (Periods -2 to 0)
Project Performance x -0.0065  (0.005) 0.0039  (0.005)
Prior Collaborations (Periods -5 to -3)
R2 0.5630 0.5992 0.6135 0.6249 0.6122 0.6291 0.6101 0.6255 0.5853 0.5866
Δ R2 0.036 *** 0.014 * 0.011 * 0.017 * 0.015 ** 0.001
Wald Test (added variables) 12.16 *** 6.23 * 9.73 ** 6.63 ** 13.27 *** 0.58
Wald Test (all variables with Prior Collaboration) 12.16 *** 15.18 *** 11.55 *** 7.32 *** 6.52 *** 13.81 *** 12.01 *** 4.40 * 2.38 †
Wald Test (all variables with Project Performance) 6.23 * 7.46 *** 6.09 * 5.97 *** 5.76 * 8.93 *** 5.26 * 2.94 †
n 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239
Note:  Robust standard errors in parantheses.
Significance tests (two-tailed): †  p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
TABLE 5
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Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
 
Constant 0.46 (0.97) -1.29 (1.65) -1.97 (1.64) -1.68 (1.56) -1.15 (1.59)
Production Time (#Days) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Cast Size 0.01 † (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Above-the-Line Cast Credits 0.04 † (0.15) 0.01 (0.15) 0.04 (0.14) 0.09 (0.14) 0.10 (0.14)
Director Prior Nominations 0.40 * (0.37) 0.20 (0.30) 0.23 (0.30) 0.19 (0.28) 0.27 (0.27)
Actor1 Prior Nominations 0.49 (0.44) 0.29 (0.55) -0.11 (0.48) -0.61 (0.51) -0.20 (0.50)
Actor2 Prior Nominations 0.25 * (0.25) 0.15 (0.27) 0.04 (0.23) -0.01 (0.20) -0.22 (0.18)
Actor3 Prior Nominations 1.21 (0.81) 0.74 (0.80) 0.60 (0.74) 0.16 (0.69) 0.16 (0.69)
Producer Prior Nominations 0.28 † (0.16) 0.25 † (0.15) 0.20 (0.16) 0.19 (0.16) 0.18 (0.16)
Camera Prior Nominations -0.02 (0.22) -0.01 (0.21) 0.01 (0.21) 0.00 (0.21) 0.00 (0.21)
Art Director Prior Nominations 0.00 (0.17) -0.06 (0.17) -0.12 (0.17) -0.11 (0.17) -0.13 (0.17)
Editor Prior Nominations -0.13 (0.58) -0.17 (0.53) -0.11 (0.53) -0.20 (0.52) -0.25 (0.50)
Director Prior Films 0.01 ** (0.01) 0.01 ** (0.00) 0.01 ** (0.00) 0.01 * (0.00) 0.01 * (0.00)
Actor1 Prior Films 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Actor2 Prior Films -0.01 † (0.01) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00)
Producer Prior Films 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Camera Prior Films 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Art Director Prior Films 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Editor Prior Films -0.02 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
No Editor (Dummy) -0.04 (1.13) 0.19 (1.08) 0.62 (1.00) 0.95 (1.00) 0.75 (0.94)
No Art Director (Dummy) 0.27 (0.70) 0.00 (0.66) 0.21 (0.62) 0.28 (0.63) 0.36 (0.61)
Release Quarter 1 (Dummy) 0.20 (0.49) 0.22 (0.43) 0.38 (0.42) 0.34 (0.42) 0.36 (0.42)
Release Quarter 2 (Dummy) 0.03 (0.40) 0.10 (0.38) 0.18 (0.38) 0.06 (0.35) 0.04 (0.35)
Release Quarter 3 (Dummy) -0.73 (0.56) -0.75 (0.46) -0.57 (0.45) -0.56 (0.44) -0.56 (0.43)
Comedy Genre (Dummy) -0.50 (0.39) -0.44 (0.38) -0.46 (0.38) -0.55 (0.38) -0.48 (0.38)
Musical Genre (Dummy) 0.12 (0.48) 0.12 (0.46) 0.04 (0.45) -0.08 (0.45) 0.00 (0.45)
Serial (Dummy) -0.80 (0.72) -1.18 † (0.65) -1.25 † (0.65) -1.52 * (0.65) -1.42 * (0.65)
Revbox (Dummy) -1.41 (1.19) -0.52 (1.08) 0.24 (0.95) 0.32 (0.89) 0.62 (0.88)
Boweekly (Dummy) -1.84 (1.31) -0.89 (1.21) -0.21 (1.09) -0.12 (1.05) 0.23 (1.05)
Time Dummies (8) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
20th Century Fox 1.99 * (0.96) 2.33 * (0.95) 3.05 ** (0.95) 2.83 ** (0.95) 2.62 ** (0.95)
20th Century -0.78 (0.82) -0.38 (1.06) 0.36 (1.00) 0.39 (1.04) 0.39 (0.95)
Columbia 0.60 (0.65) 1.19 (0.77) 1.68 * (0.73) 1.62 * (0.81) 1.37 † (0.77)
1st National 1.45 (1.78) 1.76 (1.91) 2.46 (1.93) 2.44 (1.93) 2.04 (1.95)
Fox 0.20 (0.75) 0.79 (0.83) 1.39 † (0.82) 1.33 (0.88) 1.10 (0.83)
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 0.30 (0.83) 0.66 (0.93) 1.22 (0.92) 1.16 (0.94) 1.02 (0.91)
Paramount -0.01 (0.80) 0.71 (0.87) 1.52 † (0.91) 1.45 (0.94) 1.16 (0.89)
RKO -0.16 (0.64) -0.05 (0.75) 0.52 (0.77) 0.23 (0.73) 0.01 (0.72)
United Artists 1.32 (1.04) 1.67 (1.08) 2.03 † (1.07) 1.55 † (0.88) 0.98 (0.81)
Universal -1.31 (0.90) -0.81 (0.97) -0.21 (1.00) -0.37 (0.98) 0.73 (0.94)
Warner Brothers 0.14 (0.71) 0.40 (0.78) 0.98 (0.79) 0.82 (0.83) 0.62 (0.79)
Warner Brothers/First National 0.64 (1.00) 0.79 (1.05) 1.07 (1.07) 1.01 (1.05) 0.65 (1.01)
Future Collaborations (Periods 1 to 4) 0.110 *** (0.022) 0.091 *** (0.024) 0.083 *** (0.024) 0.080 *** (0.024) 0.077 ** (0.024)
Project Performance 0.015 (0.014) 0.018 (0.014) 0.017 (0.013) 0.014 (0.013)
Prior Collaborations (Periods -2 to 0) -0.069 (0.082) -0.059 (0.079) -0.063 (0.077) -0.082 (0.083)
Project Performance x Prior Collaborations (Periods -2 to 0) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Color 2.740 † (1.465) 10.256 (8.440) -29.030 *** (6.574)
Project Performance x Color 0.142 (0.090) 0.322 *** (0.065)
Prior Collaborations (Periods -2 to 0) x Color -0.146 (0.119) 1.295 *** (0.271)
Project Performance x Prior Collaborations (Periods -2 to 0) x Color -0.012 *** (0.002)
R2 0.5837 0.6167 0.6290 0.6430 0.6657
Δ R2 0.033 ** 0.012 * 0.014 * 0.023 ***
Wald Test (added variables) 3.02 * 3.50 † 1.24 29.69 ***
Wald Test (all variables with Color) 3.50 † 1.85 11.46 ***
Wald Test (all variables with Project Performance) 4.48 * 5.35 ** 4.35 ** 11.98 ***
Wald Test (all variables with Prior Collaboration (Periods -2 to 0)) 0.82 1.04 1.16 9.50 ***
n 239 239 239 239
Note: Robust standard errors in parantheses.
Significance tests (two-tailed): †  p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
TABLE 6
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Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant -0.327  (0.982) -0.478  (1.443) -2.024  (1.486) 0.318  (1.068) 0.598  (1.013)
Production Time (#Days) 0.001  (0.006) 0.001  (0.006) 0.003  (0.006) 0.003  (0.006) 0.008  (0.005)
Cast Size 0.004  (0.009) 0.003  (0.010) 0.003  (0.009) 0.007  (0.007) 0.009  (0.007)
Above-the-Line Cast Credits -0.015  (0.170) -0.027  (0.175) -0.110  (0.160) -0.067  (0.161) -0.167  (0.138)
Director Prior Nominations 0.101  (0.198) 0.093  (0.187) 0.069  (0.181) 0.187  (0.168) 0.092  (0.143)
Actor1 Prior Nominations -0.038  (0.316) -0.012  (0.363) 0.104  (0.358) -0.073  (0.336) 0.105  (0.310)
Actor2 Prior Nominations 0.633 * (0.262) 0.633 * (0.264) 0.722 ** (0.270) 0.576 * (0.239) 0.557 ** (0.206)
Actor3 Prior Nominations 0.549  (0.578) 0.572  (0.612) 0.701  (0.629) 0.744  (0.547) 0.573  (0.457)
Producer Prior Nominations -0.382 * (0.182) -0.384 * (0.186) -0.198  (0.143) -0.160  (0.124) -0.112  (0.119)
Camera Prior Nominations 0.041  (0.164) 0.042  (0.164) 0.088  (0.158) 0.141  (0.146) 0.140  (0.131)
ArtDirector Prior Nominations -0.046  (0.123) -0.044  (0.125) 0.105  (0.130) -0.056  (0.115) -0.108  (0.112)
Editor Prior Nominations 0.551  (0.417) 0.536  (0.426) 0.523  (0.379) 0.396  (0.320) 0.358  (0.288)
Director Prior Films 0.002  (0.004) 0.003  (0.005) 0.002  (0.004) 0.003  (0.004) 0.001  (0.004)
Actor1 Prior Films 0.006  (0.006) 0.006  (0.006) 0.003  (0.006) 0.009 † (0.005) 0.009 † (0.005)
Actor2 Prior Films -0.003  (0.004) -0.003  (0.004) -0.004  (0.004) -0.005  (0.004) -0.006  (0.004)
Producer Prior Films 0.037 ** (0.013) 0.038 ** (0.014) 0.034 *** (0.010) 0.021 *** (0.006) 0.014 * (0.006)
Camera Prior Films -0.005  (0.006) -0.004  (0.006) -0.004  (0.006) -0.004  (0.005) 0.001  (0.005)
ArtDirector Prior Films 0.000  (0.003) 0.000  (0.003) -0.002  (0.003) -0.001  (0.003) -0.002  (0.003)
Editor Prior Films 0.007  (0.010) 0.008  (0.010) 0.004  (0.010) 0.008  (0.009) 0.006  (0.008)
No Editor (Dummy) -1.013  (0.660) -1.023  (0.688) -0.998  (0.657) -0.947 † (0.535) -1.020 * (0.467)
No Art Director (Dummy) 0.553  (1.322) 0.453  (1.328) 0.135  (1.123) 0.002  (0.898) 0.152  (0.905)
Release Quarter 1 (Dummy) 0.149  (0.305) 0.157  (0.311) -0.063  (0.298) 0.024  (0.290) -0.042  (0.262)
Release Quarter 2 (Dummy) -0.108  (0.416) -0.080  (0.432) -0.371  (0.408) -0.463  (0.375) -0.210  (0.313)
Release Quarter 3 (Dummy) -0.305  (0.358) -0.289  (0.355) -0.405  (0.329) -0.437  (0.310) -0.390  (0.268)
Comedy Genre (Dummy) 0.220  (0.315) 0.214  (0.323) 0.209  (0.301) 0.193  (0.281) 0.260  (0.256)
Musical Genre (Dummy) 0.092  (0.377) 0.098  (0.374) -0.101  (0.347) -0.101  (0.303) -0.166  (0.285)
Color (Dummy) 1.223  (1.542) 1.160  (1.534) -0.156  (1.717) 1.506  (1.518) 1.449  (1.339)
Serial (Dummy) 0.075  (0.567) 0.079  (0.590) 0.575  (0.474) 0.391  (0.421) 0.351  (0.409)
Revbox (Dummy) 0.915  (0.915) 0.838  (0.980) 0.103  (0.932) 0.242  (0.786) 0.520  (0.732)
Boweekly (Dummy) 0.320  (1.274) 0.212  (1.379) -0.483  (1.255) -0.528  (1.110) -0.036  (1.038)
0.298  (1.320) 0.449  (1.357) 1.598  (1.353) 0.589  (1.015) -0.486  (0.974)
Time Dummies (8) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
20th Century -2.131 * (0.838) -2.181 ** (0.829) -0.837  (0.909) -1.049  (0.768) -0.959  (0.771)
Columbia -1.704 * (0.750) -1.756 * (0.738) -0.016  (0.853) -0.577  (0.766) -0.694  (0.724)
1st National -1.063  (0.820) -1.215  (0.834) 0.121  (0.976) -0.264  (0.841) -0.374  (0.812)
Fox -0.166  (0.831) -0.273  (0.845) 0.946  (0.959) 0.549  (0.827) 0.492  (0.794)
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer -0.838  (1.047) -0.945  (1.056) 0.752  (1.095) 0.451  (1.016) 0.631  (1.018)
Paramount -1.318 † (0.772) -1.420 † (0.758) -0.414  (0.726) -0.237  (0.630) 0.065  (0.606)
RKO -1.074  (0.705) -1.013  (0.737) 0.579  (0.742) 0.443  (0.667) 0.433  (0.637)
United Artists 5.853 *** (1.513) 5.763 *** (1.524) 2.427  (2.011) 4.167 * (1.942) 5.170 ** (1.754)
Universal -0.989  (0.792) -1.041  (0.789) 0.333  (0.899) -0.138  (0.777) -0.281  (0.714)
Warner Brothers -1.157 † (0.686) -1.224 † (0.684) 0.177  (0.833) -0.258  (0.744) -0.235  (0.695)
Warner Brothers/First National -0.335  (0.832) -0.381  (0.828) 1.047  (0.981) 0.259  (0.856) -0.097  (0.807)
Future Collaborations (Periods 1 to 4) -0.013  (0.011) -0.011  (0.015) 0.009  (0.013) 0.005  (0.011) 0.009  (0.010)
Project Performance 0.002  (0.010) -0.001  (0.011) -0.012  (0.009) -0.007  (0.008)
Prior Collaboration (Periods -2 to 0) -0.011  (0.046) -0.007  (0.041) -0.026  (0.032) -0.003  (0.031)
Project Performance x Prior Collaborations (Periods -2 to 0) 0.000  (0.001) 0.000  (0.000) 0.000  (0.000) 0.000  (0.000)
Nonintegrated Studio 5.067 ** (1.608) -11.007  (6.680) 2.907  (5.370)
Nonintegrated  Studio x Project Performance 0.105 † (0.059) -0.046  (0.046)
Nonintegrated Studio x Prior Collaboration (Periods -2 to 0) 0.264 *** (0.077) -4.057 *** (1.192)
Nonintegrated Studio x Project Performance x Prior Collaboration (Periods -2 to 0) 0.044 *** (0.012)
R2 0.6221 0.6230 0.6694 0.7261 0.7796
Δ R2 0.001 0.046 *** 0.057 *** 0.054 ***
Wald Test (added variables) 0.18 9.93 ** 6.4 ** 13.48 ***
Wald Test (all variables with Nonintegrated Studio) 9.93 ** 9.41 *** 10.93 ***
Wald Test (all variables with Project Performance) 0.03 0.03 1.67 5.96 ***
Wald Test (all variables with Prior Collaboration (Periods -2 to 0)) 0.23 0.52 2.61 † 6.23 ***
n 239 239 239 239
Note: Robust standard errors in parantheses.
Significance tests (two-tailed): †  p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
TABLE 7
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FIGURE 1




Interaction of Project Performance and Prior Collaboration on Future Color Collaborations (Periods 1 to 4)





Interaction of Project Performance and Prior Collaboration on Future Collaborations at Different Studio (Periods 1 to 4)
for Projects at Integrated and Non-Integrated Studios
Note: This graph shows that for focal projects at non-integrated studios the combination of project success and prior collaborations has a strong 
positive effect on future collaborations governed by a different studio. The corresponding plane shows a strong incline. In contrast, the same factors 
have no such effect for focal projects at integrated studios and the corresponding plane remains flat.
Focal Project at Integrated Studio
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